UIC Law Review
Volume 37

Issue 4

Article 1

Summer 2004

SWANCC: Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying Nothing … Much?, 37
J. Marshall L. Rev. 1017 (2004)
Jeremy A. Colby

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Legislation Commons, Litigation
Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, and the Water Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jeremy A. Colby, SWANCC: Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying Nothing…Much?, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1017
(2004)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss4/1
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more
information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

SWANCC: FULL OF SOUND AND FURY,
SIGNIFYING NOTHING... MUCH?'
JEREMY

A. COLBY*

The Supreme Court's decision in Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers2 ("SWANCC")
caused great concern amongst environmentalists, regulators, and
commentators concerning the continuing viability of the Clean
Water Act 3 ("CWA").
Indeed, one commentator referred to
SWANCC as "the most devastating judicial opinion affecting the
environment ever."' These initial reactions to SWANCC, however,
may have been excessive.'
J.D., Boston University School of Law, 1999; B.A. Niagara
University,
1996. The author is a Confidential Law Clerk to Senior United States District
Court Judge John T. Elfvin of the United States District Court for the Western
District of New York and a former litigation associate at Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom LLP in Boston, Massachusetts. The views expressed in this
Article belong entirely to the author and do not reflect those of any past or
present employer or client.
The author's e-mail address is
jcolby@alum.bu.edu.
1. Cf WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 5 ("Life's but a walking

shadow, a poor player that struts and frets his hour upon the stage and then is
heard no more: it is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying
nothing.")
2. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
3. The CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000), is also known as the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act. Donna M. Downing et al., Navigating Through
Clean Water Jurisdiction:A Legal Review, 23 WETLANDS 475, 478 (2003); Paul
Boudreaux, Federalismand the Contrivancesof Public Law, 77 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 523, 538 n.81 (2003) (noting that the CWA "is a mixture of various acts,

the most significant of which was the Federal Water Pollution Control Act").
4. William Funk, The Court, the Clean Water Act, and the Constitution:
SWANCC and Beyond, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10741, 10741 (2001); accord C.
Victor Pyle, III, Note, Isolated Wetlands Jurisprudence Post-SWANCC and
Resulting Federal and State Attempts to Fill the Void, 11 SOUTHEASTERN
ENVTL. L.J. 91, 91 (2002) (noting that SWANCC "sent shock waves through
the federal and state agencies charged with protection of wetlands and other

aquatic resources").
5. See David E. Kunz, A River Runs Through It: An Analysis of the
Implications of Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers on the Clean Water Act and Federal Environmental
Law, 9 ENVTL. LAW. 463, 465 (2003).
[Ilt is not clear that the initial concerns and alarms raised by some
jurists and many legal and environmental commentators-that the
protections of the CWA will be seriously eroded and that federal
environmental law will be placed in jeopardy-have come to fruition.
1017
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Although federal courts are split over how broadly SWANCC
ought to be construed, a majority of federal appellate courts
interpret SWANCC narrowly and hold that CWA jurisdiction
extends to navigable waters and their tributaries and wetlands
adjacent thereto. In other words, most courts hold that CWA
jurisdiction exists over all waters hydrologically connected to
navigable waters. This narrow interpretation of SWANCC has
been adopted by the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeal, whereas the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has
adopted a broad interpretation of SWANCC.6
Despite the narrow interpretation adopted by a majority of
courts that have addressed the issue, SWANCC's elimination of
Indeed, it is arguable that these initial concerns have largely proven to
be false. The CWA and federal environmental law, while restricted
somewhat by the narrow holding of SWANCC, continue to be viable and
powerful forces and will likely remain so in the future.
Id.
6. See infra Part IV; Difficulties In Regulation of Wetlands: Before the
Subcomm. on Water Res. of the House Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure,
108th Cong., (2004) [hereinafter Woodley/Grumbles Testimony] (statement of
John Paul Woodley, Jr., Assistant Sec'y. of the Dep't of the Army, and
Benjamin H. Grumbles, Acting Assistant Adm'r for Water, Environmental
Protection Agency), available at 2004 WL 2011362 (noting the split between
the Fifth Circuit and the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits). The
Supreme Court, however, recently declined to address this circuit split. See
United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct.
1874 (2004); United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 1875, reh'g denied 124 S. Ct. 2407 (2004); Treacy v.
Newdunn Assocs., 344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 1874
(2004). See also United States v. Thorson, No. 03-C-0074-C, 2004 WL 737522,
at *12 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 6, 2004)
Courts are split over the question whether the inevitable conclusion of
SWANCC is that the [CWA's] coverage extends only to those wetlands
immediately adjacent to navigable waters or whether a surface level
hydrological connection may be sufficient. Recently, the United States
Supreme Court has denied three petitions for certiorari addressing this
issue.
Id.
Accordingly, one may argue that the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in
Deaton, Rapanos, and Newdunn implicitly endorsed the narrow interpretation
of SWANCC adopted by the Fourth and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeal. Cf.
Elizabeth Shogren, Clean Water Act Now Protects Some Canals and Ditches
Too, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2004, at A19 ("The Supreme Court, at least tacitly,
upheld the appellate court rulings [in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits] by
refusing to hear the developers' appeals."); National Wildlife Federation,
Supreme Court Decision Major Setback in Industry Push to Remove CWA
Protections from Many Wetlands and Streams, at httpJ/www.nwf.org/
news/story.cfm?pageId=BC 11D1FD%2D65BF%2DO9FE%2DBFFOBD41D9E6
B91D (last visited Aug. 12, 2004) (quoting Jim Murphy, Clean Water Counsel
for the National Wildlife Federation as stating that the Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari in Deaton, Rapanos and Newdunn "signaled today that
industry pressure to broadly interpret the extremely narrow SWANCC
decision is not appropriate").
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CWA jurisdiction over intrastate, non-navigable, isolated wetlands
has nonetheless adversely affected wetland preservation. Indeed,
a significant percentage of wetlands have lost CWA protection as a
result of SWANCC.7 Although SWANCC's impact may not be as
dire as commentators initially predicted, it nonetheless eliminated
federal protection for up to twenty percent of America's most
important wetlands. These wetlands provide many valuable
functions including flood control, bio-diversity, and maintaining
the integrity of America's aquatic resources.
Accordingly,
Congress should enact legislation that will restore the CWA to its
pre-SWANCC status - and it should predicate such legislation
upon congressional powers that are less controversial than its
Commerce power over intrastate activities that substantially
affect interstate or foreign commerce.
Part I of this Article discusses the CWA's regulatory
framework. Part II discusses the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the CWA in SWANCC and United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc.'
Part III discusses the split of authority that
developed concerning the scope of the CWA in the wake of
SWANCC. Part IV discusses recent decisions that have healed the
post-SWANCC split of authority, thereby making a narrow
interpretation of SWANCC the majority view amongst federal
courts. Part V concludes that SWANCC, as interpreted by a
majority of federal courts that have addressed the issue, has not
significantly altered the CWA. Part VI suggests that Congress
should enact the Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 2003
("CWARA") or similar legislation restoring the CWA to its preSWANCC status.
Part VI also discusses various bases of
congressional authority upon which the CWARA may be based,
including the Spending Clause. Part VII discusses regulatory
responses to SWANCC, culminating in the decision by the Bush
Administration to abandon plans for rule-making that would have
scaled back the CWA. Finally, Part VIII of this Article concludes
that SWANCC has eliminated federal protection over a significant
percentage of the country's most valuable wetlands, but that
SWANCC - as subsequently interpreted - has not eliminated
7. SWANCC's effect will likely fluctuate from region to region. For
example, it will have less impact in the northeast where "isolated" wetlands
are estimated to comprise one percent of total wetlands in some areas, but it
will have a serious impact in the southwest and on the west coast where many
wetlands are "isolated." See Scott G. Leibowitz & Tracie-Lynn Nadeau,
Isolated Wetlands: State-of-the-Science and Future Directions, 23 WETLANDS
663, 666-67 (2003); see also John D. Ostergren, Note, SWANCC in Duck
Country: Will Court-Ordered Devolution Fill the PrairiePotholes?, 22 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 381, 382 n.4 (2003) (discussing various regional losses and noting

estimates that ninety-eight percent of the wetlands in the Prairie Pothole
Region in Minnesota and the Dakotas are isolated).
8. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
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CWA jurisdiction to the extent originally feared.
I.

THE CWA's REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

The Army Corps of Engineers ("ACOE") and the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") co-administer the
CWA.9
Nonetheless, states and tribes may also "assume
responsibility for issuance of CWA permits for discharges into
waters and wetlands subject to the Act."" In enacting the CWA,
Congress intended to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."" Section 301(a) of
the CWA prohibits "discharge of any pollutant by any person"
except certain discharges enumerated in the CWA." One such

9. Downing, supra note 3, at 478 (discussing the respective functions of
the ACOE and the EPA in administering the CWA).
10. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act
Regulatory Definition of "Waters of the United States," 68 Fed. Reg. 1991,
1992 (Jan. 15, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122,
230, 232, 300 & 401) [hereinafter ANPRM] (summarizing various CWA
regulatory schemes). See Downing, supra note 3, at 479 (discussing the ways
in which states and tribes may implement and enforce the CWA); 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1342(b), 1344(g) (permitting qualified states to assume administration of
the section 402 and 404 permit programs with review by the ACOE); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (making a state water quality certification a prerequisite for a section
404 permit); 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (noting that Congress chose "to recognize,
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to
prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use
(including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water
resources ...).
11. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a); Riverside, 474 U.S. at 132 (holding that the CWA
was intended to combat "realities of the problem of water pollution" and noting
that it is difficult to determine the "point at which water ends and land
begins"). The history of the CWA and its predecessors is beyond the scope of
this Article, which focuses on the current status of the CWA in light of postSWANCC developments. See generally Downing, supra note 3, at 476-84
(discussing the history of the CWA and its statutory predecessor - the Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1899 (the "RHA")); Bradford C. Mank, The Murky Future
of the Clean Water Act After SWANCC: Using a Hydrological Connection
Approach to Saving the Clean Water Act, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 811, 823-36 (2003)
(discussing the history of federal regulation of navigation and the CWA);
Roderick E. Walston, The Federal Commerce and Navigation Powers: Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County's Undecided Constitutional Issue, 42
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 699, 719-42 (2002) (discussing the evolution of
Congress's power to regulate navigation); Susan E. Brabenec, Comment, Of
Commerce, Congress, and Canada Geese: Section 404 of the Clean Water Act
and the Impact of Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1105, 1109-10 (2002)
(discussing the CWA and its statutory predecessors); infra note 23 (noting
disagreement regarding the proper interpretation of the CWA's legislative
history).
12. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). See ANPRM, 68 Fed. Reg. at 1993; United States
v. Bay-Houston Towing Co., 197 F. Supp. 2d 788, 801-03 (E.D. Mich. 2002)
(summarizing the section 402 and section 404 regulatory schemes).
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exception, which is often implicated when wetlands" are at issue,
requires parties developing wetlands to obtain a section 404
permit from the ACOE "for the discharge of dredged or fill
material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites."14 In
other words, section 404(a) of the CWA authorizes the ACOE to
regulate the discharge of fill material into "navigable waters" which are defined as "the waters of the United States, including
the territorial seas." 5
Likewise, section 402 of the CWA
authorizes the ACOE to "issue a permit for the discharge of any
pollutant" from a point source into the "waters of the United
13. Although the CWA does not define "wetlands," the ACOE and the EPA
have done so. See Ostergren, supra note 7, at 388 n.21 ("Somewhat
remarkably, the CWA itself never mentions the word 'wetland.'") 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(b) (2002) (defining "wetlands" as "those areas that are inundated or
saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to
support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of
vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions"); 40 C.F.R.
§ 230.3(t) (2002) (verbatim EPA definition).
14. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). See 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (requiring section 404 permit
applicants to obtain a section 401 water quality certification from the state to
ensure that the proposed discharge would not violate state water quality
standards); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (defining "dredged material" and "fill material");
33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e)(1) (defining "fill material"). See generally Ostergren,
supra note 7, at 388-89, 403-26 (discussing the circuitous path of the section
404 permitting process); Edward A. Fitzgerald, Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: Isolated Waters,
Migratory Birds, Statutory and Constitutional Interpretations, 43 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 11, 14 n.20 (2003) (same). See also N. Carolina Shellfish
Growers Ass'n v. Holly Ridge Assocs., LLC, 278 F. Supp. 2d 654, 682-83
(E.D.N.C. 2003) [hereinafter NCSGA] (applying section 404); United States v.
Hummel, No. 00-C-5184, 2003 WL 1845365, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 8, 2003)
(same).
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). Congress intended for this definition to be broad.
Riverside, 474 U.S. at 133. The EPA has the final administrative authority to
determine the scope of "navigable waters." Downing, supra note 3, at 483.
The term "navigable waters" has spawned a host of litigation attempting to
delineate the contours of CWA jurisdiction. See, e.g., Rapanos, 339 F.3d at
447. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted a distinction between
"navigable waters" (i.e., jurisdictional waters) and "traditional navigable
waters" (i.e., "waters that may be used for commercial navigation"). See
United States v. Interstate Gen. Co., No. 01-4513, 2002 WL 1421411, at *1 n.1
(4th Cir. July 2, 2002); Lance D. Wood, Don't Be Misled: CWA Jurisdiction
Extends to All Non-Navigable Tributariesof the TraditionalNavigable Waters
and to Their Adjacent Wetlands (A Response to the Virginia Albrecht/Stephen
Nickelsburg ELR Article, to the Fifth Circuit's Decision In re Needham, and to
the Supreme Court's Dicta in SWANCC), 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10187, 10191
(2004).
After 1972, federal courts and legal commentators began to call "the
navigable waters of the United States" [i.e., waters regulated under the
RHA] the "traditionalnavigable waters of the United States" to clearly
distinguish that term from the much more extensive geographic
jurisdiction of the FWPCA of 1972, the first version of the CWA.
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States."'6
Jurisdiction under both sections 402 and 404 is
contingent upon the involvement of "waters of the United States."'
The ACOE issued 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a), which defines "waters of
the United States" in relevant part as:
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or
may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce,
including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide;
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams
(including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands,
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural
ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect
interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers
for recreational or other purposes; or
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in
interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial purpose by
industries in interstate commerce;
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the
United States under the definition;
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (4)
of this section;
(6) The territorial seas;
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are
themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (6) of
this section.' 8

16. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(a); id. at § 1362(12)(A) (defining "discharge of a pollutant" as "any
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source"); S. Fla.
Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 124 S. Ct. 1537, 1543
(2004) (construing section 1362(14)'s definition of "point source" as "mak[ing]
plain that a point source need not be the original source of the pollutant; it
need only convey the pollutant to 'navigable waters'" declining to address
whether all navigable waters "should be viewed unitarily for purposes of
NPDES permitting requirements"); NGSCA, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 675-76, 682
(applying sections 402 and 404).
17. NGSCA, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 669.
18. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a). See also 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (substantially
verbatim EPA definition of "waters of the United States"); ANPRM, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 1994 (noting that substantively similar counterpart definitions appear
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As noted above, where CWA jurisdiction exists, developers are
required to obtain permits in order to discharge fill into a
wetland. 19
In 1986, the ACOE promulgated the Migratory Bird Rule
("MBR"), ° which "clarified" that 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) extended the

in various sections of 40 C.F.R.); Ostergren, supra note 7, at 388-91
(discussing the history of the CWA's definition of "waters of the United
States").
19. See generally 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1344; Hummel, 2003 WL 1845365, at
*2 (discussing individual and general permits); Ostergren, supra note 7, at
403-26 (same). Id. at 414 (noting that developers are required to obtain either
an individual permit or a general permit, also known as a nationwide permit
("NWP")); 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (authorizing NWP permits); 67 Fed. Reg. 2020
(Jan. 15, 2002) (issuing current NWPs). An individual permit requires a
"rigorous site-specific review, including public notice and comment."
Ostergren, supra note 7, at 403. On the other hand, general permits are
permitted for classes of activities deemed by the ACOE to have "'minimal
effects' on aquatic ecosystems." Id. Moreover, general permits follow a
"relatively abbreviated review... without formal public notice and comment."
Id. See id. at 413-21 (noting that 41 NWP's are currently in force and
discussing NWP 39, which governs the development of wetlands). In any
event, before the ACOE issues either an individual or a general permit, it
must first make four findings with respect to the proposed activity pursuant to
the EPA's 404(b)(1) guidelines. Id. at 404-05. First, there must be no
"practicable' alternative to the proposed activity that would have less adverse
impact in the aquatic ecosystem." Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)). Second,
the "proposed activity will not cause or contribute to 'significant degradation'
of the waters of the United States," including "'significant adverse effects' on
human health, aquatic ecosystems, recreation, aesthetics, or economic values."
Third, the developer must take all
Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(c)).
"appropriate and practicable" steps to "minimize potential adverse impacts of
the discharge." Id. at 404 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(d)). Finally, the ACOE
may not issue a section 404 permit unless it finds that the "proposed activity
will not violate any other state or federal laws." Id. (citing 40 C.F.R.
§ 230.10(b)). Nonetheless, relatively few permit applications are denied by the
ACOE. See General Accounting Office, Waters and Wetlands: Corps of
Engineers Needs to Evaluate Its District Office Practices in Determining
Jurisdiction,at 8, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04297.pdf (Feb.
2004) [hereinafter GAO Report] (noting that in 2002, the ACOE denied 128
section 404 permit applications out of 85,445, excepting 4,143 applications
that were withdrawn by the applicant); Fitzgerald, supra note 14, at 67 n.484
(noting that, between 1995 and 1999, the ACOE only denied 0.3% of the
annual 74,500 permit applications). See also Ostergren, supra note 7, at 426
n.220 (noting that the ACOE makes 40,000 NWP determinations annually).
20. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 164 (quoting 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217). The MBR was
issued without a notice and comment period as required by the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553. Id. at 164 n.1. The MBR states in relevant
part that § 404(a) extends to intrastate waters:
a. Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by
Migratory Bird Treaties; or
b. Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds which
cross state lines; or
c. Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered species; or
d. Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.
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ACOE's jurisdiction to intrastate waters that were used as a
habitat by specified migratory birds."' The MBR has been a
controversial clarification - some say extension - of the CWA."
As discussed in Section II below, SWANCC struck down part of the
MBR.

II. SWANCC - CWA JURISDICTION DOES
NOT EXTEND TO "ISOLATED" WATERS

SWANCC has been the subject of much scholarly attention. 3
Id. at 164 (quoting 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217).
The MBR is "neither a rule nor entirely about migratory birds" because it
merely "provided, in regulatory preamble language, examples of the types of
links to interstate commerce that might be considered as a basis for CWA
jurisdiction." Leibowitz & Nadeau, supra note 7, at 664. See also Downing,
supra note 3, at 483 (discussing the MBR). But see Timothy S. Bishop et al.,
One for the Birds: The Corps of Engineers' "MigratoryBird Rule", 30 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10633, 10635 (2000) (criticizing the MBR).
21. United States v. Krilich, 303 F.3d 784, 786 n.3 (7th Cir. 2002).
22. The MBR has been struck down in the Fourth Circuit and has been
partly struck down by the Supreme Court. See United States v. Wilson, 133
F.3d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1997) (striking down the MBR and section 328.3(a)(3)
because "waters of the United States" does not include intrastate waters the
degradation of which may affect interstate commerce); SWANCC, 531 U.S. at
174 (holding that the MBR exceeds the regulatory authority granted by the
CWA).
23. See generally, Robin Kundis Craig, Beyond SWANCC: The New
Federalism and Clean Water Jurisdiction,33 ENVTL. L. 113, 126-39 (2003);
Kunz, supra note 5, at 463; Ostergren, supra note 7, at 391-401; Jon Kusler,
Memorandum Concerning SWANCC Prepared for the Association of State
Wetland
Managers,
available
at
http://www.aswm.org/fwp/swancel
aswm-int.pdf (last visited June 8, 2004) [hereinafter Kusler Memorandum];
Downing, supra note 3, at 486-88; Jason Turner, Note, SWANCC: Effects on
Federal Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act and the Expanded State Roles
in Wetland Protection, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 281 (2004); James Duquet, Note,
Could Narrowing Federal Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act Actually
Take Away States' Ability to Protect Their Own Waters? The Unintended
Consequences of SWANCC, 20 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 361, 368-73 (2003);
Michelle J. Taylor, Solid Waste Agency Northern Cook County v. Army Corps
of Engineers: the United States Supreme Court Invalidates the MigratoryBird
Rule and Raises Questions About the Commerce Clause, 79 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 301 (2002); Brandon A. Van Balen, Note, Clearing the Muddy Waters?:
An Examination of SWANCC and the Implications for Wetlands Protection
and the Administrative State, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 845, 845-56 (2001);
William F. Northrip, Note, Running Aground on the (Shoal) 'Waters of the
United States": The Supreme Court Invalidates the Migratory Bird Rule, 66
Mo. L. REV. 903 (2001); Tanya M. White & Patrick R. Douglas, Note,
Postponing the Inevitable: the Supreme Court Avoids Deciding Whether the
Migratory Bird Rule Passes Commerce Clause Muster, 9 MO. ENVTL. L. &
POLV REV. 9, 14-18 (2001); Charles Tiefer, SWANCC: Constitutional Swan
Song for Environmental Laws or No More Than a Swipe at Their Sweep?, 31
ENVTL. L. REP. 11493 (2001). Many commentators have debated whether
SWANCC was correctly decided. Compare Virginia S. Albrecht & Stephen M.
Nickelsburg, Could SWANCC be Right? A New Look at the Legislative History
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Consequently, this Article will only provide a brief summary of
SWANCC in order to avoid repeating what has been artfully
written elsewhere. Before discussing SWANCC, however, it is
important to review the Supreme Court's prior decision in United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., which construed the
CWA's "waters of the United States" and unanimously held that
the ACOE was reasonable in defining the term to include "all
wetlands adjacent to other bodies of water over which the Corps
has jurisdiction .... .""
In so holding, the Court deferred to the expertise of the ACOE
and the EPA in interpreting the CWA based on the ACOE's
"ecological judgment about the relationship between waters and
their adjacent wetlands."25 The Riverside Court also noted that the
term "navigable" has "limited import" because Congress intended
to "regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed
'navigable' under the classical understanding of that term."26 In
of the Clean Water Act, 32 ENvTL. L. REP. 11042, 11043 (2002) (concluding
that SWANCC was correctly decided because, in enacting the CWA, Congress
only intended to regulate waters that are navigable-in-fact and waters
adjacent thereto) with Wood, supra note 15, at 10187-217 (debunking and
criticizing the Albrecht/Nickelsburg Article as well as dicta in SWANCC and
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Needham) and Fitzgerald, supra
note 14, at 19-37 (criticizing SWANCC's interpretation of the CWA's
legislative history and concluding that Congress intended to abandon a
navigability requirement). This Article, however, focuses on post-SWANCC
developments as well as how Congress ought to respond. Nonetheless, any
reader interested in the CWA's legislative history is well-advised to read
Wood's Article, which humorously and forcefully challenges the
Albrecht/Nickelsburg Article.
24. 474 U.S. at 135. See id. at 131 n.8 (noting that the Court was not
addressing wetlands that are not adjacent to jurisdictional waters).
Consequently, Riverside held that the ACOE had jurisdiction over the eightyacre wetland parcel at issue because it "actually abut[ted] l a navigable
waterway." Id. at 135. SWANCC noted that Riverside held that the ACOE
had "§ 404(a) jurisdiction over wetlands that actually abutted on a navigable
waterway." SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167. The eighty-acre parcel of swampy
marshland was "near the shores of Lake St. Clair." Riverside, 474 U.S. at 124.
Accordingly, it appears as though the Supreme Court has adopted a broad
view of which wetlands are "adjacent to" "waters of the United States"
inasmuch as only part of the eighty-acre parcel abutted a jurisdictional water.
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 175-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 134.
26. Accord SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167 (discussing Riverside). Indeed, the
Court in Riverside recognized that Congress sought to overcome the
limitations of earlier pollution control statutes such as the RHA by adopting "a
broad, systemic view of the goal of maintaining and improving water quality."
Riverside, 474 U.S. at 132. As noted in Riverside, legislative history from the
Senate indicated that Congress recognized that "broad federal authority to
control pollution" was necessary because "'[w]ater moves in hydrologic cycles
and it is essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the source." Id.
at 132-33 (quoting S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 77 (1972)); see also Cong. Rec. 3375633757 (1972) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
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other words, Riverside held that the ACOE had jurisdiction over
wetlands adjacent to "waters of the United States" because of the
ACOE's conclusion that such wetlands "may affect the water
quality of adjacent lakes, rivers, and streams even when the
waters of those bodies do not actually inundate the wetlands."27
Indeed, the Riverside Court stated that:
Of course, it may well be that not every adjacent wetland is of great
importance to the environment of adjoining bodies of water. But the
existence of such cases does not seriously undermine the Corps'
decision to define all adjacent wetlands as "waters." If it is
reasonable for the Corps to conclude that in the majority of cases,
adjacent wetlands have significant effects on water quality and the
aquatic system, its definition can stand. That the definition may
include some wetlands that are not significantly intertwined with
the ecosystem of adjacent waterways is of little moment, for where it
appears that a wetland covered by the Corps' definition is in fact
lacking in importance to the aquatic environment-or where its
importance is outweighed by other values-the Corps may always
allow development of the wetland for other
uses simply by issuing a
28
permit. See 33 CFR § 320.4(b)(4) (1985).

Accordingly, Riverside held that the ACOE has jurisdiction over
wetlands hydrologically connected to "waters of the United States"
- and that it is the province of the ACOE to grant a section 404(a)
permit where a proposed discharge would not adversely affect
jurisdictional waters.29
Sixteen years after Riverside, the Supreme Court revisited
the meaning of section 404(a) of the CWA in SWANCC. SWANCC
involved a consortium of municipalities that planned to build a
solid waste disposal site at "an abandoned sand and gravel pit"
that had evolved into a forest, containing permanent and seasonal
ponds that served as a habitat for various migratory birds. 3' The

27. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 134 (emphasis added).

See id. at 134-35

(discussing the functions served by wetlands, which form the basis of the
ACOE's conclusion that "wetlands adjacent to lakes, rivers, streams, and other
bodies of water may function as integral parts of the aquatic environment even
when the moisture creating the wetlands does not find its source in the
adjacent bodies of water"); id. at 139.
28. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 135 n.9 (emphasis added). See Int'l Paper Co v.
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 486 (1987) (citing Riverside and noting that the CWA
"applies to virtually all surface water in the country").
29. The Riverside Court noted that congressional attempts to narrow the
ACOE's definition of "navigable waters" failed and that the CWA consequently
retained such term and that Congress acquiesced in the ACOE's definition of
"navigable waters," which included adjacent wetlands. Riverside, 474 U.S. at
135-38; SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167 (discussing Riverside).
30. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162-63. Consequently, SWANCC did not involve
wetland regulation, as opposed to the regulation of open waters. Id. at 163,

187 n.13. Moreover, SWANCC involved the ACOE's jurisdiction based on the
affect that waters may have on interstate commerce, as opposed to use of the
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ACOE exercised jurisdiction over the site based on the MBR.3 The
ACOE reasoned that although the abandoned mining excavations
were "not wetlands,"2 they nonetheless constituted "waters of the
United States" because they served as a habitat for various
migratory birds.u
After its permit application was denied by the ACOE,' the
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County filed suit in the
Northern District of Illinois challenging the ACOE's jurisdiction
and the merits of the permit denial. 5 The district court granted
the ACOE's motion for summary judgment on the jurisdictional
issue. 36
SWANCC appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
arguing that the ACOE exceeded its statutory authority "in
interpreting the CWA to cover nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate
waters based upon the presence of migratory birds" and that,
"Congress lacked the power under the Commerce Clause to grant
water as a channel of interstate commerce. See, e.g., United States v.
Lamplight Equestrian Ctr., No. 00C6486, 2002 WL 360652, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 8, 2002) (noting that, where bodies of water are being regulated as
channels of interstate commerce, as opposed to waters that may affect
interstate commerce, SWANCC is irrelevant because it "involved isolated
waters lacking a physical/hydrological connection to other navigable waters").
Consequently, SWANCC's discussion of Riverside is dicta and the "significant
nexus" requirement is merely a description of the holding in Riverside, as
opposed to a new standard to be applied. But see Greater Yellowstone
Coalition v. Flowers, No. 03-8034, 2004 WL 377685, at *2 n.3 (10th Cir. Mar.
2, 2004) ("The Supreme Court established the extent of the Corps' jurisdiction
over wetlands in [SWANCCI."); FD&P Enters. v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 239 F. Supp. 2d 509, 516-17 (D.N.J. 2003) ("In light of [SWANCC], it is
the view of this court that the 'hydrological connection' test is no longer the
valid mode of analysis.").
31. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 164. The ACOE initially "concluded that it had
no jurisdiction over the site because it contained no 'wetlands' or areas which
support 'vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions." Id.
at 164. The ACOE, however, reconsidered and exercised jurisdiction over the
site after the Illinois Nature Preserves Commission informed the ACOE that
migratory birds had been observed there. Id. Consequently, the ACOE
exercised jurisdiction on the basis of the M1R. Id.
32. See supra note 30; SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 164-65.
33. Id.
34. SWANCC obtained all of the necessary state and municipal regulatory
approvals, including a water quality certification from the Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency. Id. at 165. Nonetheless, the ACOE denied
SWANCC's permit application on the grounds that (1) it "had not established
that its proposal was the 'least environmentally damaging, most practicable
alternative' for disposal of non-hazardous solid waste"; (2) "SWANCC's failure
to set aside sufficient funds to remediate leaks posed an 'unacceptable risk to
the public's drinking water supply'"; and (3) "that the impact of the project
upon area-sensitive species was 'unmitigatable since a landfill surface cannot
be redeveloped into a forested habitat.'" Id. at 165.
35. Id. at 165.
36. Id.
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such regulatory jurisdiction."3 7 The court of appeals held that (1)
Congress has the authority to regulate the subject ponds "based
upon the cumulative impact doctrine" 3 and (2) that the CWA
extends as far as the Commerce Clause permits and that the MBR
was thus a reasonable interpretation of the CWA (inasmuch as the
court also held that the MBR
was constitutional). 39 The Supreme
40
Court, however, reversed.
A five-member majority of the Court held that the MBR
"exceeds the authority granted to [the ACOEI under § 404(a) of the
CWA."4 The Court, however, declined to address the significant
constitutional and federalism questions raised by [the ACOE's]
interpretation of the CWA, 2 to wit, whether Congress may
exercise the power to regulate isolated waters based on the
presence of migratory birds consistent with the Commerce
Clause.'
In arriving at its decision, the Court reviewed its
previous decision in Riverside." The SWANCC Court noted that it
"was the significant nexus between the wetlands and 'navigable
waters' that informed our reading of the CWA in Riverside
Bayview Homes."45 Although the Court in Riverside found that

37. Id. at 165-66.
38. Id. at 166 (citing SWANCC, 191 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 1999)) ("[T]he
cumulative impact doctrine, under which a single activity that itself has no
discernable effect on interstate commerce may still be regulated if the
aggregate effect of that class of activity has a substantial impact on interstate
commerce."). The court of appeals held that, in the aggregate, the destruction
of migratory bird habitats had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id.
at 166 (citing SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 850).
39. Id. (citing SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 851-52).
40. SWANNC, 531 U.S. at 166.
41. Id. at 174.

42. Id.
43. Id. at 162.
44. Id. at 167.
45. Id. SWANCC, however, failed to acknowledge footnote 9 in Riverside,
which expressly stated that the ACOE's jurisdiction included "some wetlands
that are not significantly intertwined with the ecosystem of adjacent
waterways." See Riverside, 474 U.S. at 135 n.9. Although one could argue
that this omission amounted to an attempt by the SWANCC Court to narrow
the interpretation of the CWA that had been adopted in Riverside, such an
argument should fail. First, inasmuch as SWANCC concerned isolated ponds
that were not adjacent to any "waters of the United States," any statement
about "adjacent to" jurisdiction would be dicta, as opposed to footnote 9 of
Riverside, which was necessary to the Court's holding with respect to the
ACOE's jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to "waters of the United States."
See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167-68 (noting that Riverside did not address
"discharges of fill material into wetlands that are not adjacent to bodies of
open water...").

Second, it

appears

as though

the SWANCC

Court

erroneously characterized Riverside where it stated that the Riverside Court
"found that Congress's concern for the protection of water quality and aquatic
ecosystems indicated its intent to regulate wetlands 'inseparably bound up
with the 'waters' of the United States.'" SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167 (emphasis

2004]

SWANCC: Full of Sound and Fury

1029

Congress acquiesced to the ACOE's definition of "navigable
waters" when it failed to supplant such definition in 1977, the
SWANCC Court concluded that congressional inaction did not
amount to acquiescence to the ACOE's regulations concerning
"isolated" waters.4
added). Cf Riverside, 474 U.S. at 134.
We cannot say that the Corps' conclusion that adjacent wetlands are
inseparably bound up with the 'waters' of the United States-based as it
is on the Corps' and EPA's technical expertise-is unreasonable. In
view of the breadth of federal regulatory authority contemplated by the
Act itself and the inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to
regulable waters, the Corps' ecological judgment about the relationship
between waters and their adjacent wetlands provides an adequate basis
for a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands may be defined as waters
under the Act.
Id. (emphasis added). Consequently, Riverside is the most relevant authority
with respect to the ACOE's jurisdiction under the CWA over wetlands
adjacent to waters of the United States. See Thomas L. Casey, III, Note,
Reevaluating "Isolated Waters". Is Hydrologically Connected Groundwater
"Navigable Water" Under the Clean Water Act?, 54 ALA. L. REV. 159, 174
(2002) (noting that SWANCC's "substantial nexus" test "is nothing more than
a clarification of the standard first established in Riverside for determining
the scope of 'waters of the United States' under the [CWA]").
46. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 170-71. As noted below, the SWANCC dissenters
took the majority to task for this ostensible inconsistency. See id. at 186-87
(Stevens, J., dissenting). A powerful dissenting opinion authored by Justice
Stevens (joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) opined that the
majority took "an unfortunate step that needlessly weakens our principal
safeguard against toxic water." Id. at 175 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens first noted that the CWA, unlike its predecessors such as the RHA,
was designed to combat pollution, not navigability obstructions. Id. at 174-82
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Consequently, the majority erred in finding that
nothing in the CWA's legislative history "signifies that Congress intended to
exert [nothing] more than its commerce power over navigation." Id. at 181.
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 168 n.3). Indeed, Justice Stevens
found persuasive a Senate Conference report explaining that "navigable
waters" was "to 'be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation'"
and that the majority dismissed "this clear assertion of legislative intent with
the back of its hand." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting S. Conf. Rep. No.
92-1236, at 144 (1972)). Justice Stevens further ridiculed the majority opinion
for unfaithfully departing from Riverside. Id. at 175-76 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). First, Riverside involved "an 80-acre parcel of low-lying marshy
land that was not itself navigable, directly adjacent to navigable water, or
even hydrologically connected to navigable water, but which was part of a
larger area, characterized by poor drainage, that ultimately abutted a
navigable creek." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Indeed, according to Justice
Stevens, Riverside found that the ACOE had CWA jurisdiction based on an
ecological connection rather than a hydrological one. Id. at 176 n.2 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (discussing Riverside, 474 U.S. at 134-35). Moreover, such an
ecological connection existed for "many, and possibly most, 'isolated' waters."
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Accordingly, the dissenters would have held that
the ecological connection between SWANCC's ponds and migratory birds was
sufficient to confer CWA jurisdiction upon the ACOE. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Second, the dissent found troubling the majority's refusal to
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In sum, SWANCC eliminated "CWA jurisdiction over isolated,
intrastate, non-navigable waters where the sole basis for asserting
CWA jurisdiction is the actual or potential use of the waters as
habitat for migratory birds....",
Consequently, the continuing
vitality of section 328.3(a)(3) as a basis of CWA jurisdiction is not
clear. '
Nonetheless, the ACOE's jurisdiction over wetlands
"adjacent to waters of the United States" was unaffected by
SWANCC, which involved neither wetlands nor adjacency
acknowledge the fact that Riverside held that Congress acquiesced in the
ACOE's assertion of jurisdiction in its 1975 regulations. Id. at 186-87
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that Riverside did not address
isolated wetlands. Id. at 187 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Consequently, the
dissent found unpersuasive the majority's assertion that SWANCC was
consistent with Riverside. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Third, the majority
refused to give deference under Chevron to the ACOE's interpretation of the
CWA, whereas the Court did so in Riverside, which also involved the ACOE's
interpretation of its jurisdiction under the CWA. Id. at 191 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). In addition to the majority's infidelity to Riverside, the dissent
criticized the majority's contention that the ACOE's assertion of jurisdiction
encroached upon the states' traditional power over land use. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). According to Justice Stevens, the "CWA is not a land-use code; it
is a paradigm of environmental regulation[, which] is an accepted exercise of
federal power." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Assoc., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 282 (1981)). Indeed, the
CWA respects federalism by permitting states to supplant federal control by
their own regulatory programs pursuant to section 404(g). Id. at 192 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Finally, the dissent concluded that the ACOE's exercise of
jurisdiction "over 'isolated' waters that serve as habitat for migratory birds
falls well within the boundaries set by [the] Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Accord White & Douglas, supra
note 23, at 16-18 (discussing the dissenting opinion in SWANCC); Mank,
supra note 11, at 854-58 (same).
47. ANPRM, 68 Fed. Reg. at 1994. Accord Memorandum by Gary S. Guzy,
General Counsel of the EPA, and Robert M. Anderson, Chief Counsel of the
ACOE, available at http://www.spk.usace.army.mil/pub/outgoing/co/reg/
SWANCC.pdf [hereinafter 2001 Joint Memorandum] (Jan. 19, 2001).
48. 2001 Joint Memorandum, supra note 47, at 2. See id. (noting that
SWANCC "held that the Corps' application of § 328.3(a)(3) was invalid" but
that it "did not strike down § 328.3(a)(3) or any other component of the
regulations defining 'waters of the United States') (emphasis added); id. at 4
(noting that SWANCC "did not specifically address what other connections
with interstate commerce might support assertion of CWA jurisdiction over
'nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters' under subsection (a)(3)"); id.
(suggesting that CWA jurisdiction may exist over nonnavigable, isolated,
intrastate waters that either "could affect 'waters of the United States'" or
"could affect interstate or foreign commerce"); Downing, supra note 3, at 491
(noting that SWANCC "did not specifically address what alternative bases for
jurisdiction of [non-navigable intrastate isolated] waters remained valid");
Ostergren, supra note 7, at 395 (noting that, after SWANCC, it is unclear
what remains of the MBR or § 328.3(a)(3)). But see United States v. Reuth
Dev. Co., 335 F.3d 598, 603-04 (stating in dicta that, under SWANCC's
reasoning, the CWA's "effect on interstate commerce" jurisdiction appears
doomed because it suffers from the same infirmity as the MBR, no nexus to
navigability).

2004]

SWANCC: Full of Sound and Fury

jurisdiction. '9
Indeed, SWANCC did not involve "the wellestablished rule including tributaries in the definition of
'navigable waters. '' " Consequently, SWANCC did not alter the
rule that tributaries are "navigable waters." 51
SWANCC, however, has generated much litigation over the
meaning of "isolated,"5 "adjacent " ' and "significant nexus."' As
demonstrated below, the meaning ascribed to these terms has
serious ramifications concerning CWA jurisdiction.5
Moreover,
SWANCC did not address whether an ecological connection to a

49. See Memorandum by Robert E. Fabricant, General Counsel of the EPA,
and Steven J. Morello, General Counsel, Department of the Army, 68 Fed.
Reg. 1991, 1997 (Jan. 15, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 Joint Memorandum] (noting
that SWANCC did not disturb Riverside and that "wetlands adjacent to
traditional navigable waters clearly remain jurisdictional after SWANCC");
2001 Joint Memorandum, supra note 47, at 2, 5-6 (noting that SWANCC "did
not overrule" Riverside); Reuth, 335 F.3d at 604 (2003) (noting that the
defendant "simply raisled] the question of what 'adjacency' means, which
SWANCC did not address at all"). See also Riverside, 474 U.S. at 135 (finding
reasonable the ACOE's conclusion that adjacent wetlands are inseparably
bound up with the "waters of the United States").
50. Cal. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. Diablo Grande, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d
1059, 1075 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist.,
243 F.3d 526, 533-34 (9th Cir. 2001)).
51. See id. at 1076 (citing Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264,
270-272 (5th Cir. 2001)). See also infra note 73 (discussing case law holding
that the CWA extends to all tributaries of "navigable waters").
52. Casey, supra note 45, at 165 (noting that SWANCC left "unclear which
waters are isolated and which are sufficiently 'adjacent to' navigable bodies of
water or their tributaries"); Ralph W. Tiner, GeographicallyIsolated Wetlands
of the United States, 23 WETLANDS 494, 494 (2003) [hereinafter Tiner,
Geographically Isolated Wetlands] (noting that the "term 'isolated wetland' is
a relative one that can be defined from geographic, hydrologic and ecological
perspectives").
53. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c) (defining "adjacent" as "bordering, contiguous,
or neighboring," including wetlands separated from other waters by manmade
or natural barriers); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(b) (counterpart definition). See also
2003 Joint Memorandum, 68 Fed. Reg. at 1997 (noting that the ACOE and the
EPA have defined "adjacent wetlands," but that the Supreme Court has
neither defined the term nor "stated whether the basis for adjacency is
geographic proximity or hydrology"); Lamplight, 2002 WL 360652, at *8
(holding that a wetland must border or touch a body of water in order to be
"adjacent" thereto); Thorson, 2004 WL 737522 at *10-17 (discussing adjacency
under SWANCC).
54. Leibowitz & Nadeau, supra note 7, at 664 (noting that neither the
ACOE nor the EPA have defined "significant nexus").
55. See infra Parts III-IV (discussing post-SWANCC case law); Jeanne A.
Calderon, The SWANCC Decision and the Future of Federal, State, and Local
Regulation of Wetlands, 30 REAL EST. L.J. 303, 304 (2002) (noting that the
number of wetlands affected by SWANCC "will depend upon the interpretation
of such words as 'adjacent,' 'tributary,' and 'significant nexus'");
Woodley/Grumbles Testimony, supra note 6 (noting that existing regulations
define neither "tributaries" nor "adjacency").
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jurisdictional water is sufficient to confer CWA jurisdiction."
Finally, "SWANCC represent[s] a major reinterpretation of
the scope of the ...
CWA by re-emphasizing the importance of
navigability in the definition of 'waters of the United States'
protected by the [CWA]."7 As discussed below, SWANCC and its
impact on the CWA has been the subject of much litigation in the
lower federal courts.
III. THE JUDICIARY'S RESPONSE TO SWANCC:

A SPLIT

OF AUTHORITY DEVELOPED

CONCERNING THE SCOPE OF THE CWA

Varying interpretations of SWANCC resulted in a split of
authority among lower federal courts as to how narrowly (or
broadly) it was to be applied - with a corresponding impact on the
scope of the CWA. One district court described the post-SWANCC
landscape when it stated:
In the wake of [SWANCC], courts have struggled with evaluating
the jurisdictional reach of § 404(a) of the CWA.... Courts
interpreting the scope of [SWANCC] have essentially split into two
camps.
Under one reading, the [SWANCC] case represents a
significant shift in the Court's CWA jurisprudence, calling into
question the continuing validity of CWA jurisdiction over waters
which are not either actually navigable or directly adjacent to
navigable waters. On the other hand, an alternative reading of
[SWANCC] holds that the case only applied to "isolated waters," and
thus would permit continued CWA jurisdiction over all waters which
have at least a minimal hydrological connection to navigable
waters. s

56. As noted above, the SWANCC dissenters would have so found. See
supra note 46; infra note 127. See also Leibowitz & Nadeau, supra note 7, at
668-69 (noting that isolated wetlands are ecologically connected to other
aquatic systems). Indeed, the CWA was enacted to protect, inter alia, the
"biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). Accordingly,
if the degradation of an intrastate water would adversely affect a
jurisdictional water, then CWA jurisdiction should exist because Congress has
the authority to regulate activities that affect the channels of interstate
commerce. See supra note 30. But see Thomas M. Swett, Comment, Isolated
Waters and the Clean Water Act After SWANCC: What Does the Commerce
Clause Have To Do With It?, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 929, 941 (2003)
(concluding that "attempting to establish [SWANCC's significant] nexus
ecologically or through attenuated ground water connections is most likely
reaching beyond the jurisdiction granted by the CWA").
57. Downing, supra note 3, at 491 (noting that SWANCC's reinterpretation
is contrary to "the CWA's legislative history and twenty years of judicial
interpretation that focused on hydrologic cycles and the potential for
pollutants to move"). But see Am. Canoe Ass'n v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth.,
306 F. Supp. 2d 30, 39 (D.D.C. 2004) ("Solid Waste did not purport to
reinterpret the general scope of the CWA.").
58. FD&P, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 513. Accord Lamplight, 2002 WL 360652 at
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Although this Article focuses on how the SWANCC split
largely (but not completely) disappeared in 2003, a brief overview
of the pre-2003 post-SWANCC split is helpful. As noted above,
two competing schools of thought exist. The broad interpretation
adopted by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals is contrasted by the
narrow interpretation adopted by the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals.59
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals construed SWANCC
broadly in Rice v. Harken Exploration Corp.,' noting that,
according to SWANCC's reasoning, a body of water is subject to
federal jurisdiction if it "is actually navigable or is adjacent to an
open body of navigable water."61 Although Rice construed the Oil
Pollution Act ("OPA)," the court held that the phrase "navigable

*5 ("Courts interpreting SWANCC have reached varying results, the primary
rift being whether the [MBR] was the decision's only casualty, or whether the
holding limited the Corps' jurisdiction even further."); Thorson, 2004 WL
737522, at *12-13 (citing cases that are split over the scope of SWANCC);
NCSGA, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 673-74 (same); Carabell v. United States Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 257 F. Supp. 2d 917, 930-31 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (same).
59. Compare Rice, 250 F.3d at 268-69 (adopting a broad interpretation of
SWANCC), and United States v. Needham (In re Needham), 354 F.3d 340,
345-47 (5th Cir. 2003) (following Rice) with Headwaters, 243 F.2d at 533-34
(adopting a narrow interpretation of SWANCC in the Ninth Circuit), and
Deaton, 332 F.3d at 698 (following Headwaters in the Fourth Circuit), and
Rapanos, 339 F.3d at 447 (adopting Headwaters in the Sixth Circuit), and
Reuth, 335 F.3d at 598 (construing SWANCC narrowly in the Seventh
Circuit), and United States v. Krilich, 303 F.3d 784, 791 (7th Cir. 2002)
("[SWANCC's] limited holding does not represent a significant change in the
law such that it would be equitable to modify or vacate the Consent Decree.")
The Second Circuit has not yet addressed the effect, if any, that SWANCC has
had on the scope of the CWA. See Altman v. Town of Amherst, No. 01-7468,
2002 WL 31132139, at *5 (2d Cir. Sept. 26, 2002) (remanding case for
determination of, inter alia, "whether the freshwater wetlands within New
York were 'waters of the United States' within the meaning of the CWA, see

[SWANCC]").
60. 250 F.3d at 268-69.
61. Rice, 250 F.3d at 269. But see Downing, supra note 3, at 490 (describing
this language from Rice as dicta that "incorrectly paraphrased a passage from
SWANCC... that referred to wetlands adjacent to any open water body
covered by the CWA, whether navigable or not"); Interstate Gen. Co., 2002 WL
1421411, at *3 (rejecting defendant's argument that "SWANCC limited the
Corps' jurisdiction to (1) traditional navigable waters and (2) wetlands
immediately adjacent to traditional navigable waters"); Michael P. Healy,
Law, Policy, and the Clean Water Act: The Courts, the Bush Administration,
and the Statute's Uncertain Reach, 55 ALA. L. REV. 695 (2004) (characterizing
Rice's analysis as confusing and incoherent). Cf Thorson, 2004 WL 737522, at
*14 ("The [Rice] court appears to have assumed that immediacy was implied in
the word 'adjacent' and that navigability was implied in the phrase 'open
waters.'"); infra note 183 (noting that the majority of courts have rejected the
Fifth Circuit's "direct abutment" requirement).
62. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(a).
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waters" has the same meaning in the OPA as it does in the CWA.'
Rice involved a non-navigable creek that was a tributary of a
navigable body of water.'
Nonetheless, despite the seemingly
broad holding in Riverside, Rice held that SWANCC "limited the
scope of the CWA" to waters that are actually navigable or
adjacent to such waters. 5 Finding that the CWA's definition of
"navigable waters" does not include groundwater,' Rice held that
groundwater pollution was not covered by the OPA" Additionally,
63. Rice, 250 F.3d at 267 (examining the legislative history of the OPA and
noting that "Congress generally intended the term 'navigable waters' to have
the same meaning in both the OPA and the CWA"). The Rice court found that
the definition of "navigable waters" was the same for both the OPA and the
CWA. Id. See also United States v. Jones, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1357 (M.D.
Ga. 2003) (citing Rice and finding the definitions to be "identical"). There is,
however, a slight difference.
Compare 33 U.S.C. § 2701(21) (defining
"navigable waters" as "waters of the United States, including the territorial
sea") (emphasis added), with 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (defining "navigable waters"
as "waters of the United States, including the territorial seas") (emphasis
added). It is doubtful that this slight variation has any substantive import,
however. Indeed, Rice noted that the legislative history of the OPA indicates
that the phrase is to be accorded the same meaning in the OPA that it is given
in the CWA. Rice, 250 F.3d at 267. But see Wood, supra note 15, at 10188
(characterizing Rice's statements with respect to the CWA as dicta).
64. Rice, 250 F.3d at 265 (noting that Big Creek is a small seasonal creek
that runs to the Canadian River.). See id. at 268 n.4 (noting that wetlands
were not at issue in the case).
65. Id. at 268-69. See 2003 Joint Memorandum, 68 Fed. Reg. at 1997 ("The
analysis in [Rice] implies that the Fifth Circuit might limit CWA jurisdiction
to only those tributaries that are traditionally navigable or immediately
adjacent to a navigable water.").
66. Rice, 250 F.3d at 269.
67. Id. at 271 n.8 (discussing Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. DaytonHudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 1994), which held that CWA
jurisdiction does not extend to groundwater "simply because those waters may
be hydrologically connected to protected surface waters"). But see Idaho Rural
Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1179-80 (D. Idaho 2001) (noting that
federal courts are split on the issue of whether groundwater hydrologically
connected to jurisdictional waters are "waters of the United States"). The
better interpretation of "waters of the United States," however, includes
groundwater because, inasmuch as the CWA is designed to eliminate the
pollution of navigable waters, groundwater hydrologically connected to a
navigable water is a source of pollution that may reach a navigable water that
is no less dangerous than pollution coming from a surface connection. See id.
at 1180 (holding that "the CWA extends federal jurisdiction over groundwater
that is hydrologically connected to surface waters that are themselves waters
of the United States" because "Congress's decision not to comprehensively
regulate groundwater as part of the CWA does not require the conclusion that
Congress intended to exempt ground water from all regulation-particularly
under circumstances where the introduction of pollutants into the
groundwater adversely affects the adjoining surface waters"); Susan Griffithe,
Note, Isolating the Problem by Finding the Connection: The Proper Approach
to Regulating Groundwater Under the Clean Water Act: Idaho Rural Council v.
Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (D. Idaho 2001), 27 S.ILL. U. L.J. 437, 454-56
(2003) (concluding that Bosma adopted the correct approach concerning CWA
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despite evidence that the defendant's oil-drilling activities
contaminated navigable waters, Rice held that the OPA was not
applicable because the polluted surface waters were "seasonal
streams" that the court found to be neither navigable nor adjacent
to navigable waters.' Most important for purposes of this Article,
however, was Rice's broad interpretation of SWANCC, which was
adopted by several district courts - thereby causing a split of
authority over the CWA's scope after SWANTCC.69
In contrast to Rice and its progeny is the Ninth Circuit Court

jurisdiction over groundwater); Casey, supra note 45, at 174 (concluding that
groundwater that is hydrologically connected to jurisdictional waters
constitutes "navigable waters" under the CWA). Although groundwater
connections may be more susceptible to certain types of pollution than others,
such as oil pollution as opposed to dredged spoils or sediment, see Cal.
Sportfishing Prot. Alliance, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1076, the ACOE (through
administration of the section 404(a) permit process) is in the best position to
ascertain which discharges into groundwater hydrologically connected to a
navigable water are not likely to pollute a navigable water. See Town of
Norfolk v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 968 F.2d 1438, 1451 (1st Cir.
1992) (concluding that the EPA and the ACOE was in the best position to
make an "ecological judgment about the relationship between surface waters
and groundwaters" connected to surface waters). Cf. Riverside, 474 U.S. at
135 n.9 (1985) (noting that the ACOE was permitted to exercise jurisdiction
over wetlands that were "not significantly intertwined with the ecosystem of
adjacent waterways" because discharges into such wetlands could be
authorized by a permit). Indeed, the ACOE's scientific expertise places it in a
better position than a federal court to make determinations as to the
detrimental effect that a groundwater discharge would have on a navigable
water.
68. Rice, 250 F.3d at 270-71. The court thus found the evidence insufficient
to support a finding that the surface waters at issue were "sufficiently linked
to an open body of navigable water as to qualify for protection under the OPA."
Id. at 271.
69. See United States v. Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1014-17 (E.D.
Mich. 2002) (holding that, under SWANCC, the CWA does not cover wetlands
adjacent to non-navigable waters), rev'd, 339 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 1875 (2004); United States v. RGM Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d
780, 786-88 (E.D. Va. 2002) (holding that, under SWANCC, the CWA does not
cover wetlands adjacent to ditches and streams that only occasionally flow into
navigable waters); United States v. Newdunn Assocs., 195 F. Supp. 2d 751,
765 (E.D. Va. 2002) (holding that the ACOE failed to show a "sufficient
connection" to navigable waters where the water at issue traveled via several
manmade ditches), rev'd sub nom. Treacy v. Newdunn Assocs., LLP, 344 F.3d
407 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub nom. Newdunn Assocs., LLP v. United
States Corps. of Eng'rs, 124 S.Ct. 1874 (2004). See also In re Needham, 279
B.R. 515, 518 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2001) (following SWANCC and Rice and
holding that the OPA did not cover an oil spill into a body of water that was
not itself "actually navigable," even though the oil may eventually reach the
Gulf of Mexico), affd sub nom. United States v. Needham, Nos. 01-1987, 011898, 2002 WL 1162790, at *1 (W.D. La. Jan. 22, 2002), rev'd, 354 F.3d 340,
345-47 (5th Cir. 2003) (following Rice but finding that the bankruptcy court's
factual findings were clearly erroneous). As noted below, however, Rapanos,
Newdunn and RGM are no longer good law. See infra Part IV.
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of Appeals' decision in Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation
District,0 which construed SWANCC narrowly and concluded that
the CWA was not altered by SWANCC. Headwaters held that the
CWA covered non-navigable irrigation canals that served as
tributaries of navigable waters.7' In reaching its decision, the
court of appeals held that non-navigable tributaries of navigable
waters are "waters of the United States" because of the
hydrological connection and consequent potential for pollution to
reach navigable waters.72 Consequently, Headwaters held that
SWANCC only applied to isolated bodies of water with no
hydrological connection to navigable waters. 2
Many courts have adopted Headwaters's rationale and
conclusion.74 For example, the district court in United States v.
70. 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001).
71. Id. at 528, 533-34. In Headwaters,the defendant failed to get a NPDES
permit with respect to its use of a herbicide in its irrigation canals. Id. at 52830. Notably, the court found the irrigation canals to be tributaries even
though they were part of a "closed system" and that discharges into navigable
waters were accidental and infrequent. Id. at 533-34 (noting that the
irrigation canals leaked into navigable waters in 1983 and 1996). See United
States v. Phillips, 356 F.3d 1086, 1094 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming CWA
conviction because the creek at issue was a tributary of a navigable water).
72. Headwaters, 243 F.3d at 533 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Eidson,
108 F.3d 1336, 1341-42 (11th Cir. 1997) and United States v. TGR Corp., 171
F.3d 762, 764 (2d Cir. 1999)). Eidson held that manmade ditches and canals
that flowed intermittently into a navigable creek were "waters of the United
States." Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1342. TGR held that a non-navigable brook was
a "water of the United States" because it was a tributary of a navigable creek.
TGR, 171 F.3d at 765.
73. Headwaters, 243 F.3d at 533. See also FD&P, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 515
(noting that Headwaters "concluded that [SWANCC] applied only to isolated
waters with no hydrological connection to navigable waters").
74. See infra Part IV; Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't. v. Henry
Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943, 954-55 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying Headwaters);
Lamplight, 2002 WL 360652 at *5 (noting that courts other than Rice have
concluded that "SWANCC struck the [MBR], pushing 'isolated waters' that
may affect interstate commerce out of the Corps' jurisdiction, without altering
the Corps' reach where its jurisdiction is based on a water's use or potential
use as a channel of interstate commerce"); Cal. SportfishingProt.Alliance, 209
F. Supp. 2d at 1075-76 (following Headwaters); Colvin v. United States, 181 F.
Supp. 2d 1050, 1055-56 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (following Headwaters and holding
that a lake was a "navigable water" because it is used by foreign and
interstate tourists); United States v. Buday, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1288-92 (D.
Mont. 2001) (holding that CWA jurisdiction applies to tributaries of navigable
waters). See also Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1180 (holding "that the CWA
extends federal jurisdiction over groundwater that is hydrologically connected
to surface waters that are themselves waters of the United States"); Aiello v.
Town of Brookhaven, 136 F. Supp. 2d 81, 119 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that
"non-navigable tributaries of navigable waters [are] waters of the United
States under the CWA") (quoting TGR, 171 F.3d at 764-65). In 2004, courts
continue to interpret SWANCC narrowly, thus following appellate decisions
such as Headwaters, Deaton, and Rapanos. See, e.g., Thorson, 2004 WL
737522 at *13-14 (following Deaton and Rapanos). Indeed, one district court
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Lamplight Equestrian Center, Inc. followed Headwaters and its
progeny in holding that CWA jurisdiction extends over wetlands
with a hydrological connection, albeit intermittent or periodically
broken, with a navigable water because SWANCC did not alter the
ACOE's jurisdiction over waters as channels of interstate
commerce as opposed to waters that may affect interstate
commerce such as the isolated ponds in SWANCC.7
Moreover,
several circuit courts of appeals have held that SWANCC did not
alter the CWA such that pre-SWANCC consent decrees that were
not based on the MBR should be set aside. 6 Headwaters became
the majority view in 2003.
IV. HEADWATERS's NARROW CONSTRUCTION OF

SWANCC

BECAME THE MAJORITY VIEW IN

2003

As noted above, federal courts were sharply divided over the
appropriate scope of the CWA in the wake of SWANCC - with
Rice and Headwaters serving as the lead cases for alternate
interpretations of SWANCC.
This split of authority largely,
although not entirely, disappeared in 2003. In addition to a
majority of district courts that have addressed the issue, the
extended Headwaters by holding that SWANCC "does not impose a
hydrological connection requirement for adjacent wetlands and waters." N.
Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, No. C01-04686WHA, 2004 WL
201502, at *9-10 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2004) (holding that wetlands were
adjacent to navigable waters that were between fifty and "a few hundred feet"
away).
75. Lamplight, 2002 WL 360652, at *5-7. Indeed, "SWANCC did not limit
Corps jurisdiction under the [CWA] to navigable waters and wetlands adjacent
to navigable waters." Id. at *8. Consequently, Lamplight held that a
hydrological connection sufficient to establish CWA jurisdiction exists even
though it may be intermittent or "linked through other connections two or
three times removed from the navigable water." Id. at *7-8.
76. See Reuth, 335 F.3d at 604-05 (holding that SWANCC did not affect the
validity of the consent decree entered into by defendant because it was based
on adjacency jurisdiction under 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(7)); Krilich, 303 F.3d at
791 ("[SWANCC's] limited holding does not represent a significant change in
the law such that it would be equitable to modify or vacate the Consent
Decree."); United States v. Interstate Gen. Co., 152 F. Supp. 2d 843, 847 (D.
Md. 2001) ("The SWANCC case is a narrow holding in that only 33 CFR
§ 328.3(a)(3), as applied to the Corps' creation of the [MBRI, is invalid
pursuant to a lack of congressional intent."), affd, 2002 WL 1421411, at *2-3
(4th Cir. July 2, 2002) (refusing to invalidate defendants' CWA convictions,
which resulted from the filling of wetlands adjacent to intermittent culverts
and creeks that flow into two non-navigable creeks that eventually reach
navigable waters six miles away, on the basis of SWANCC); Interstate Gen.
Co., 2002 WL 14214111, at *2-3 (holding that SWANCC did not affect "a
fundamental or significant change in the law governing in this case" because
the consent decree was not based on the MBR, which had been invalidated by
Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, before SWANCC was decided). See also Colvin, 181 F.
Supp. 2d at 1056 (denying motion to set aside CWA conviction in light of
SWANCC).
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Fourth and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals, and ostensibly the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, have also adopted Headwaters's
view that SWANCC was a narrow decision that did not alter the
ACOE's jurisdiction over waters as channels of interstate
commerce such that any hydrological connection to a navigable
water suffices to establish CWA jurisdiction. 7
In FD&P Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of
EngineersTM a district court in New Jersey followed Rice and
broadly construed SWANCC. FD&P involved wetlands adjacent to
a creek that was a tributary of a navigable water.7" The issue was
whether the CWA conferred "jurisdiction over wetlands abutting a
non-navigable tributary, which feeds into a navigable body of
water.""
Although this issue had been answered in the
affirmative by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals before SWANCC,
FD&P held that SWANCC "limited the scope of the CWA."8'
Specifically, the court held that the "significant nexus" required by
SWANCC "must constitute more than a mere 'hydrological
connection.'" 2
Applying this heightened standard, the court nonetheless
found that summary judgment was inappropriate because there
was a genuine issue of material fact whether there would be a
substantial nexus between the wetlands at issue and the
Hackensack River.' FD&P, however, erred in broadly construing
77. Mank, supra note 11, at 820 ("[A] majority of courts have read
SWANCC narrowly to mean that although the [CWA] does not reach isolated,
non-navigable waters with no connection to navigable waters, it does reach
inland waters or wetlands that have a hydrological or ecological connection to
navigable waters."); Craig, supra note 23, at 132 ("The emerging majority rule
among the federal courts and EPA ALJs is that any surface water connection
to waters that are navigable in the traditional sense-however intermittent,
convoluted, or human-made the connection might be-is sufficient to confer
CWA jurisdiction over a water body.").
78. 239 F. Supp. 2d 509 (D.N.J. 2003). FD&P was decided on January 15,
2003.
79. Id. at 517 (finding that the wetlands at issue drained into Penhorn
Creek, which was a tributary of the Hackensack River, establishing a
hydrological connection one mile away from the wetlands).
80. Id. at 511.
81. Id. at 512-13 (discussing United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719 (3d Cir.
1993)). Pozsgai held that, under Riverside, the CWA covered wetlands
adjacent to a non-navigable stream that flowed into a navigable waterway.
Pozsgai, 999 F.2d at 730-33.
82. FD&P, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 516-17 ("In light of [SWANCC], it is the view
of this court that the 'hydrological connection' test is no longer the valid mode
of analysis."). Notably, the court appears to have been somewhat reluctant to
follow what it construed to be the holding in SWANCC. Id. at 515-16 ("[A]
reading of [SWAINCCI which would confine CWA jurisdiction solely to
navigable waters and those waters one step removed from navigable waters
could ultimately serve to undermine the basic purposes of the CWA...
[nievertheless, we are obligated to read the CWA in light of [SWANCCI.").
83. Id. at 517. Nonetheless, the court rejected FD&P's argument that "the
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SWANCC. Indeed, the court noted that it was constrained by
SWANCC under the doctrine of stare decisis.'
SWANCC,
however, was inapplicable because, unlike FD&P, it was not a
channels of interstate commerce case.' FD&P thus construed Rice
and SWANCC too broadly.'
In any event, as discussed below,
FD&P represents a minority view regarding the CWA in a postSWANCC world.
In Carabell v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, a
district court in Michigan followed Headwaters because it found
more persuasive "the reasoning of the courts which have concluded
that the Court's ruling in SWANCC was narrow, and did not
substantially narrow the jurisdiction of the [ACOE] under the
CWA."7
Carabell reviewed an administrative appeal from a
decision by the ACOE to deny a section 404 permit,' thus applying
the highly deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard of
review.9
The court upheld the ACOE's jurisdictional
determination on the ground that the subject wetlands were
adjacent to non-navigable bodies of water that drained into a
navigable water, thus establishing a "significant nexus" under
SWANCC.'
The court also upheld the ACOE's permit denial
because the Carabells failed to overcome the regulatory
presumption that a practical alternative was available.9' Carabell
demonstrates that courts accord the ACOE wide discretion in
making section 404(a) permit determinations.'

Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over the FD&P wetlands violates the
Commerce Clause" because FD&P was building a commercial facility for
interstate freight transportation. Id. at 518.
84. Id. at 516.
85. See supra note 30 (noting that SWANCC's discussion of Riverside is

dicta).
86. Jones, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 1359 n.7 (criticizing FD&P and noting that
Rice did not limit OPA jurisdiction to waters that are actually navigable).
87. 257 F. Supp. 2d at 930-31 (refusing to follow Rice).
88. Id. at 924-25. The Carabells wanted to build a condominium complex
on a nineteen acre parcel of land that contained twelve acres of wetlands. Id.
at 919-20. A state agency granted the Carabells' permit request, but the EPA
objected and exercised federal jurisdiction over the property. Id. at 920. The
EPA authorized the ACOE to determine whether it should issue a section
404(a) permit, which it declined to issue on the grounds that (1) jurisdiction
existed because the wetlands were adjacent to two ditches that drained into a
navignble water (Lake St. Clair); (2) the project was against the public
interest; and (3) the developers failed to rebut the presumption that less
damaging practicable alternatives existed. Id. at 920-26. The Carabells'
administrative appeal was also denied. Id. at 926.
89. Id. at 926-27.
90. Id. at 930-32.
91. Id. at 933-34 (applying 33 C.F.R. § 320.4 and 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)).
92. See Ostergren, supra note 7, at 405 (noting that the ACOE "exercises
significant discretion" in making permit determinations).
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In United States v. Hummel,' a district court in Illinois
followed Headwaters. Hummel involved sewer installation in a
wetland connected or adjacent to a creek that is a tributary of a
navigable water.' The defendants were prosecuted for violating
the CWA and they moved for summary judgment.'
The court
rejected the defendants' interpretation of SWANCC, that the CWA
only covers wetlands that are directly adjacent to a navigable
water.'
Rather, the court followed the majority approach in
Headwaters, which had been followed by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals. 7 Hummel held that the ACOE permissibly
exercised jurisdiction over the subject wetlands because a
hydrological connection existed - which constituted a "significant
nexus" between the wetland and a navigable water.98
In United States v. Jones, a district court in Georgia
construed SWANCC and Rice narrowly.'
Jones held that the
defendants violated both the OPA and the CWA by discharging oil
into a storm drain that emptied into several ditches and a wetland
adjacent to a river one to two miles away from the defendants'
property."'
In reaching this holding, the court made several
findings. First, Jones applied the same analysis for the OPA and
0
CWA claims.1'
Second, the court followed Headwaters in adopting
a narrow construction of SWANCC.'0 The Jones court also found
that courts that construed Rice (and hence SWANCC) broadly did
so in error.' °3 Rather, Rice's "significant nexus" analysis suggested
that the creek at issue would be navigable if there was evidence of
a sufficient link." Consequently, having concluded that SWANCC

93. 2003 WL 1845365 at *6-7.
94. Id. at *3. See also id. at *3-4 (noting that the subject wetlands were
connected to Indian Creek, a tributary of the Des Plaines River).
95. Id. at*1.
96. Id. at *4-5 ("Contrary to Defendants' position, the Supreme Court's

holding [in SWANCCI did not attempt to define precisely how connected a
particular body of water must be to a navigable water to receive CWA

protection.").
97. Id. at *5 (citingKrilich, 303 F.3d at 791).
98. Id. at *6-7 (noting that "[m] any courts, both before and after SWANCC,"
have held that a hydrological connection establishes CWA jurisdiction, even
where the regulated water is two or three times removed from the navigable
water).

99. 267 F. Supp. 2d at 1357-60.
100. Id. at 1353, 1357-60.
101. Id. at 1357 (following Rice).
102. Id. at 1360 ("The Court believes a complete reading of SWANCC reveals
that the Supreme Court actually had no intention of defining 'navigable

waters' as narrowly as courts have done in cases such as Needham and FD&P
Enterprises.").
103. Id. at 1359-60 (discussing FD&P, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 516, and In re
Needham, 279 B.R. at 518). Jones further noted that "[any other interpretive
language" in SWANCC beyond its MBR analysis was dicta. Id. at 1360.
104. Id. at 1359 n.7 ("If the Fifth Circuit [in Rice] is expressing, as other
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"did not dramatically alter CWA case law," the Jones court applied
the Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Eidson, which
held that CWA jurisdiction exists if water is hydrologically
connected to a navigable water.0 5
In North Carolina Shellfish Growers Ass'n v. Holly Ridge
Associates, LLC ("NCSGA"), a district court in North Carolina
followed Headwaters and construed SWANCC narrowly."
NCSGA held that CWA jurisdiction extended to various waters on
the defendant's property because they were hydrologically
connected to navigable waters. 107 Specifically, the court held that
an "absence of channelized flow between" a navigable water and a
non-navigable water does not prevent the non-navigable water
from being considered a tributary under the CWA.1" Having found
the waters at issue to be jurisdictional, the court applied both
sections 402 and 404. The court found that the defendant violated
section 402 by digging ditches without a NPDES permit."9 The
courts contend it is, that OPA applies only to 'actually navigable' waters, the
court would not have focused on whether there was a sufficient link to an open
body of navigable water in determining whether there was a navigable
water.").
105. Id. at 1360; supra note 72.
106. 278 F. Supp. 2d 654, 674 (E.D.N.C. 2003) ("This Court agrees with the
reasoning of those courts that have taken a narrower view of SWANCC [,
which] involved isolated waters lacking any hydrological connection to
traditional navigable waters.").
Indeed, NCSGA noted that SWANCC
reaffirmed Riverside. Id.
107. Id. at 669-75. The Court found that defendant's property fell within
CWA jurisdiction because it (1) contained wetlands that drained into a
navigable water (i.e, Stump Sound), id. at 670; (2) contained manmade
ditches on the property that were connected to the jurisdictional wetlands, id.
at 670, 672-73; (3) was connected to Stump Sound by a non-navigable
tributary (i.e., Cypress Branch), id. at 671; (4) contained wetlands adjacent to
non-navigable tributaries of navigable waters, id. at 672-74; and (5) contained
an "on-site lake" that was an impoundment of jurisdictional waters and which
drained into a navigable water, id. at 675. Notably, the court held that
"evidence of a discharge is critical to a finding of liability, [but that] it is not
relevant to the Court's determination ofjurisdiction." Id.
108. NCSGA at 671. See id. (discussing Headwaters and Eidson, which have
held that intermittent streams are covered by the CWA). NCSGA found this
position to be consistent with SWANCC because any hydrological connection
establishes the "significant nexus" required for CWA jurisdiction because
there is potential for the pollution of navigable waters where the "hydrological
connection occurs in a channelized flow or a network of flat bottoms and
braids, continuously or intermittently." Id. at 671-72 (discussing Deaton, 332
F.3d at 698).
109. Id. at 675. In so finding, the court noted that redepositing sediment
after digging a ditch constituted a "discharge" within the meaning of the CWA
and that "pollutant" included items such as sediment and sand. Id. at 676.
The court also applied 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(A) and found that the defendants
failed to obtain a permit to discharge stormwater "associated with an
industrial activity" - which constitutes a "pollutant" under the CWA. Id. at
678-79 (discussing 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14)(x), which defines "industrial
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defendant's ditch digging activities (without a section 404(a)
permit) also violated section 404."1
In addition to a majority of district courts that have
addressed the scope of SWANCC in 2003, recent decisions by the
Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have greatly
healed the post-SWANCC split.
A majority of circuits now
construe SWANCC narrowly.
A. The Fourth Circuit Court ofAppeals
Construes SWANCC Narrowly
On June 12, 2003, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
adopted a narrow construction of SWANCC in United States v.
Deaton."' The Deatons were convicted of violating the CWA by
failing to get a permit before digging a ditch designed to drain
wetlands on their property."' The wetlands at issue were adjacent
to a ditch that was hydrologically connected to a navigable water,
which was eight miles away from the Deatons' wetlands."3 The
district court granted the Deatons' summary judgment motion on
the ground that their use of the sidecasting technique to dig the
ditch did not constitute a "discharge" of pollutants within the
meaning of the CWA." 4 The court of appeals, however, reversed,
holding that the CWA's definition of "discharge" encompassed
sidecasting."' The case was thus remanded back to the district

activity" to include "clearing, grading and excavation, except operations that
result in the disturbance of less than five acres of total land area").
110. Id. at 682-83. Although the court found that the defendant had violated
section 404, it also found a genuine issue of material fact as to the
applicability of an exemption. Id. at 683.
111. 332 F.3d at 698.
112. Id. at 702-03. The Deatons had a contractor dig an 1100-foot ditch
across the property, piling the excavated dirt on either side of the ditch, a
practice known as sidecasting. Id. at 703. See United States v. Deaton, 209
F.3d 331, 335-37 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that sidecasting in a jurisdictional
wetland is the discharge of a pollutant under the [CWAI, even though there is
'no net increase of materials present in the wetland"). Several other courts
have held that sidecasting constitutes a "discharge" within the meaning of the
CWA. See Borden Ranch P'shp v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 261
F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that plowing or "deep ripping" wetlands
constituted discharge of a pollutant within meaning of CWA), affd, 537 U.S.
99 (2002); Hummel, 2003 WL 1845365 at *8-9 (following Deaton, 209 F.3d at
335-36).
113. Deaton, 332 F.3d at 702-03. It was undisputed that the Deatons'
wetlands were adjacent to a drainage ditch that "drains into a culvert under
Morris Leonard Road [which goes under the road and] drains into another
ditch, known as the John Adkins Prong of Perdue Creek [and that] Perdue
Creek flows into Beaverdam Creek [which] is a direct tributary of the
Wicomico River, which is navigable." Id. at 702.
114. Id. at 703.
115. Id. (discussing Deaton, 209 F.3d at 337).

2004]
court.

SWANCC: Full of Sound and Fury

1043

1 6

Shortly after the case was remanded, SWANCC was decided.
Consequently, the Deatons sought reconsideration of whether
CWA jurisdiction extended to their wetlands." 7 The Deatons
argued that, "under SWANCC, the [CWA] cannot be read to
extend [ACOE] jurisdiction to their wetlands or the roadside ditch
[adjacent thereto] and that if the [CWA does extend that far,
Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause.""'
The district court denied the motion, holding that, inter alia, CWA
jurisdiction extended to the Deatons' wetlands because they were
hydrologically connected to a navigable water."9 The court of
appeals affirmed the district court on appeal.
Deaton began its analysis by reviewing the CWA's statutory
framework, which prohibits discharges into "navigable waters,"
defined as "waters of the United States."" ° The ACOE further
defines "waters of the United States" as encompassing, inter alia,
traditional navigable waters, tributaries of covered waters, and
wetlands adjacent to covered waters. 2' Deaton held that the CWA,
as interpreted by the ACOE's regulations, "fits comfortably within
Congress's authority to regulate navigable waters. " 22
In so
holding, the court made several legal conclusions in undertaking
"a somewhat complicated analysis. " " First, the court found that
the analysis in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.1 4 was applicable because the case did not present a
serious constitutional question. 12
Inasmuch as SWANCC
indicated that the CWA was based on Congress's power over
navigable waters (i.e., as a channel of interstate commerce),
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Deaton, 332 F.3d at 704.
121. Id. (discussing 33 C.F.R. §§ 328.3(a)(1), (5), (7)). The court noted that
"[sleveral courts have held that SWANCC limited [Riverside's] holding to
wetlands adjacent to traditional navigable waters." Id. (citing Rice, 250 F.3d
at 268-69; RGM, 222 F. Supp. 2d at 780-86; Newdunn, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 763,
767-68; Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 1015-16). Notably, however, the Deatons
did not press for such an interpretation of SWANCC. Id. Rather, they argued
that their wetlands were not adjacent to a covered water. Id.
122. Id. at 704-05.
123. Id. at 705.
124. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
125. Deaton, 332 F.3d at 705 ("[Wlhen we do not face the sort of serious
constitutional questions that would lead us to assume Congress did not intend
to authorize [the regulation's] issuance, we may decide the constitutional
question and proceed to the Chevron analysis.") (internal quotations omitted)
(second alteration in original); id. at 708 (concluding that the ACOE's
.regulatory interpretation of the term 'waters of the United States' as
encompassing nonnavigable tributaries of navigable waters does not invoke
the outer limits of Congress's power or alter the federal-state framework").
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Deaton held that "Congress's authority over the channels of
commerce is thus broad enough to allow it to legislate, as it did in
the Clean Water Act, to prevent the use of navigable waters for
injurious purposes."126 Consequently, the court held that Congress
had the authority to regulate non-navigable waters that serve as a
tributary of a navigable water, because the pollution of such
tributaries has the potential to reach navigable waters.'27 In other
words, Deaton found that the CWA extends to all waters and
adjacent wetlands that are hydrologically connected to navigable
waters.'28 Second, Deaton held that the ACOE may regulate
"trivial" discharges such as "sidecasting" because Congress has the
authority to decide whether the aggregate effect of such discharges
justifies regulation of all such discharges.'29 Third, the CWA does
not interfere with the balance of federalism because Congress's
power to regulate navigable waters as channels of commerce is a
power that "exists alongside the states' traditional police
powers." 0
126. Id. at 705-08. Indeed, Deaton noted that
Congress's power over channels of interstate commerce, unlike its power
to regulate activities with a substantial relation to interstate commerce,
reaches beyonid the regulation of activities that are purely economic in
nature [and that the] power to regulate channels of interstate commerce
allows Congress to make laws that protect the flow of commerce.
Id. at 706 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964)). Consequently, under this interpretation, SWANCC strengthened
CWA jurisdiction by holding that it was based on Congress's power over
navigability, which does not require a substantial relation to economic
activity. Id. (discussing Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917),
which held that Congress had the power, when enacting the Mann Act, to
prohibit the transportation of "any woman or girl" across state lines for
immoral purposes, conduct that "was entirely noncommercial"). See Thorson,
2004 WL 737522 at *14 (noting that 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(7) subjects wetlands to
the CWA "because of their connection with waters that are navigable in fact"
and concluding that "the textual concerns guiding the Court's opinion in
SWANCC are [thus] not implicated"); id. at *16 ("In arguing that
congressional authority to regulate the channels of interstate commerce
empowers Congress to regulate only those activities threatening the channel's
suitability to transport goods, defendants advocate a construction that
contravenes long-standing commerce clause precedent [as set forth in
Caminetti].").
127. Deaton, 332 F.3d at 707 ("The power over navigable waters also carries
with it the authority to regulate non-navigable waters when that regulation is
necessary to achieve Congressional goals in protecting navigable waters' Any
pollutant or fill material that degrades water quality in a tributary of
navigable waters has the potential to move downstream and degrade the
quality of the navigable waters themselves.") (citations omitted).
128. Consequently, Deaton implicitly overruled RGM, 222 F. Supp. 2d 780.
129. Deaton, 332 F.3d at 707 (discussing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1943)).
130. Id.
Indeed, "[a]lthough States have important interests in
regulating... natural resources within their borders, this authority is shared
with the Federal Government when the Federal Government exercises one of
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After concluding that the analysis in Chevron was applicable,
the Deaton court accorded deference to the ACOE's interpretation
of its regulation as extending jurisdiction over the roadside ditch
adjacent to the Deatons' wetlands as a "tributary" within the
meaning of the CWA."' First, the Deaton court found that the
CWA was ambiguous in its definition of "waters of the United
States" as to whether such included distant, non-navigable
tributaries of navigable waters. 132 Second, Deaton held that the
ACOE's regulation" - extending jurisdiction to non-navigable
tributaries of navigable waters - was ambiguous. Although the
drainage ditch at issue was clearly a tributary of a navigable
water, it was ambiguous whether section 328.3(a)(5) applied to
tertiary tributaries as well as direct or primary tributaries."
Consequently, the court deferred to the ACOE's interpretation of
section 328.3(a)(5)."3
Third, the court found that the ACOE's
interpretation of "tributary" - which included every tributary in
the system that eventually reaches a navigable water - was not
"plainly erroneous.""
Fourth, Deaton held that ACOE's
interpretation of the CWA was reasonable because of the nexus
between navigable waters and their non-navigable tributaries in
terms of the potential for downstream pollution."'
Chevron
deference
was
thus
accorded
to
the
ACOE's
interpretation
of the
8
CWAY'
On September 10, 2003, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
again construed SWANCC narrowly in Treacy v. Newdunn
Associates, LLP, which was an ACOE enforcement action involving
wetlands hydrologically connected to a navigable water by a series
of connections including a man-made ditch crossing under a
highway." The Treacy court applied Deaton and held that CWA

its enumerated powers.... " Id. (citing Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 204 (1999)) (alterations in original).
131. Id. at 708-09.
132. Id. at 709.
133. Id. See 33 C.F.R. §328.3(a)(5) (defining "waters of the United States" to
include tributaries of navigable waters).
134. Deaton, 332 F.3d at 710-11
135. Id. at 710.
136. Id. at 710-11.
137. Id. at 711-12. To this end, Deaton held that the ACOE may change its
interpretation (from its 1974 interpretation) as long as the new interpretation
is reasonable. Id.
138. Id.
139. 344 F.3d at 407. See id. at 409-10 ("[Tlhe Newdunn Wetlands remain

connected to the navigable waters of Stony Run by the intermittent flow of
surface water through approximately 2.4 miles of natural streams and
manmade ditches (paralleling and crossing under 1-64)."). Treacy reversed the
decision in Newdunn, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 765 (holding, inter alia, the ACOE

failed to prove a "sufficient connection between the wetlands" and a navigable
water). Treacy, 344 F.3d at 417.
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jurisdiction existed over the Newdunn wetlands because a
hydrological connection with navigable waters constituted a
"sufficient nexus." 4 °
Significantly, the court found that
"Newdunn's insistence that SWANCC limited the Corps'
jurisdiction solely to those wetlands adjacent to navigable watersin-fact is plainly incorrect."'
Treacy also held that a
subterranean manmade ditch constituted a "tributary" for CWA
purposes.
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
construes SWANCC narrowly.'4
B. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
Construes SWANCC Narrowly
On August 5, 2003, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
adopted a narrow construction of SWANCC in United States v.
Rapanos.'" Rapanos traversed a tortured path within the federal
court system that eventually led to the reinstatement of his
conviction for unlawfully filling wetlands in violation of the
4
CWA."'
After appealing his conviction, the Supreme Court

140. Id. at 416-17 ("In sum, the Corps' unremarkable interpretation of the
term 'waters of the United States' as including wetlands adjacent to
tributaries of navigable waters is permissible under the CWA because
pollutants added to any of these tributaries will inevitably find their way to
the very waters that Congress has sought to protect.").
141. Id. at 415 n.5. SWANCC merely held that the ACOE's attempt to
exercise "jurisdiction over isolated ponds that had no hydrologic connection
whatsoever to navigable waters could not stand." Id. at 415 (emphasis added).
Treacy further noted that, "[als we held in [Wilson, 133 F.3d at 253-54], and as
the Supreme Court affirmed in SWANCC, the Corps' jurisdiction does not
extend to the limits of the Commerce Clause." Id. at 416.
142. Id. at 417 ("If this court were to conclude that the 1-64 ditch is not a
'tributary' solely because it is manmade, the CWA's chief goal would be
subverted. Whether man-made or natural, the tributary flows into traditional,
navigable waters."). See Cal. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance, 209 F. Supp. 2d at
1075-76 (holding that an underground pipeline was sufficient hydrological
connection within the meaning of the CWA).
143. Notably, however, Deaton made only passing reference to Headwaters,
and did not cite it as authority for a narrow interpretation of SWANCC. See
Deaton, 332 F.3d at 710-11. Moreover, Treacy followed Deaton and failed to
cite Headwaters.
144. 339 F.3d at 447.
145. Id. at 448. The Michigan Department of Natural Resources ("MDNR")
informed Rapanos that his land contained wetlands and that a permit would
be required in order to start development. Id. at 449. Rapanos hired a
consultant who found the property to contain between forty-nine and fifty-nine
acres of wetlands. Id. Rapanos told the consultant to destroy any paper
evidence concerning the wetlands and threatened to sue him if he did not
comply. Id. Despite warnings from the EPA and the MDNR, Rapanos began
filling the wetlands. Id. After a search warrant was obtained, twenty-nine
acres of wetlands were found on Rapanos's land. Id. Rapanos was convicted
for unlawfully filling in wetlands in violation of the CWA. Id. at 448-50.
Rapanos subsequently appealed, was denied certiorari, appealed again, was
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remanded the case to the district court in light of SWANCC.'46
The district court set aside Rapanos's conviction and
dismissed the case on the ground that SWANCC altered CWA
jurisdiction such that federal jurisdiction did not extend to
Rapanos's wetlands because they were "not directly adjacent to
navigable waters" and because Rapanos's activities did not affect
navigable waters that were twenty miles away. 47' The district
court's decision in Rapanos was often cited for the proposition that
a split of authority existed concerning whether SWANCC should
be interpreted narrowly when making CWA jurisdictional
determinations."
As noted, however, the district court's ruling
was reversed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Although Rapanos's wetlands were "between eleven and
twenty miles away from the nearest navigableD" waterway,'49 they
were adjacent to a drainage ditch that was hydrologically
connected to a navigable-in-fact water.'" Accordingly, the court of
appeals held that jurisdiction existed because of the "ample nexus"
between the wetlands and the "navigable waters." 51
Several aspects of the court of appeals's rationale are
noteworthy. First, Rapanos narrowly construed SWANCC, noting
that it merely invalidated the MBR,"' but that it did not restrict
the CWA's "coverage to only wetlands directly abutting navigable
water."" Rapanos, therefore, held that CWA jurisdiction extends
to wetlands that are not directly adjacent to navigable waters.TM

granted certiorari, had his case remanded by the Supreme Court in light of
SWANCC, and had his case dismissed by the district court on remand. Id.
The court of appeals, however, reversed the district court and reinstated
Rapanos's conviction. Id.
146. Id. at 448-50.
147. Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 1015-16. The district court noted that the
SWANCC dissent found the "wetlands in [SWANCC)"to be ecologically
connected and that the majority referred to "the wetlands as isolated,
indicating what is likely a significant shift in its CWA jurisprudence." Id. at
1014 n.3.
148. See, e.g., Carabell,257 F. Supp. 2d at 929.
149. Rapanos, 339 F.3d at 449. The wetlands at issue were "connected to the
Labozinski Drain (a one hundred year-old man-made drain) which flows into
Hoppler Creek which, in turn, flows into the Kawkawlin River, which is
navigable." Id.
150. Id. at 453.
151. Id.
152. Id. In so finding, the court rejected Rapanos's argument, which had
been accepted by the district court, that SWANCC restricted CWA coverage
"to only wetlands directly abutting navigable water." Id. Rather, SWANCC
invalidated the MBR "because it found 'nothing approaching a clear statement
from Congress that it intended [the Act] to reach an abandoned sand and
gravel pit.' Id. (quoting SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174) (alteration in original).

153. Id.
154. Rapanos, 339 F.3d at 452-53.
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5
Second, Rapanos adopted the reasoning of Deaton,"
which, as
noted above, held that a nexus between navigable waters and their
non-navigable tributaries was sufficient to confer CWA
jurisdiction."'
Finally, the Rapanos court found that CWA
jurisdiction existed where wetland contamination could result in
contamination of navigable waters.5 7
Consequently, under
Rapanos, a hydrological connection between navigable waters and
wetlands adjacent to non-navigable waters confers CWA
jurisdiction - despite the fact that the hydrological connection
was between eleven and twenty miles long and consisted of several
links.lu
On July 26, 2004, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
reaffirmed its narrow interpretation of SWANCC in United States
v. Rapanos ("Rapanos IT')."69 The court of appeals noted that "the
majority of courts have interpreted SWANCC narrowly to hold
that while the CWA does not reach isolated waters having no
hydrological connection with navigable waters, it does reach
inland waters.""6 Furthermore, as discussed below, the Rapanos
II court rejected
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' holding in
6
Needham.11

C. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
Construes SWANCC Narrowly
On July 10, 2003, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
decided United States v. Reuth Development Co., which construed
SWANCC narrowly.6 ' Unlike Deaton or Rapanos, which were
enforcement actions under the CWA, the issue in Reuth was
whether a pre-SWANCC consent decree could be vacated in light
of SWANCC. 16 3 The developer sought to vacate or modify the
consent decree in light of SWANCC pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." In affirming the district
court's denial of the developer's motion, the Reuth court noted that
155. Id. at 453 (following Deaton, 332 F.3d at 708-09).
156. Deaton, 332 F.3d at 712.
157. Rapanos, 339 F.3d at 453 (holding that CWA jurisdiction existed
because "[a]ny contamination of the Rapanos wetlands could affect the Drain,

which, in turn could affect navigable-in-fact waters").
158. Id. at 449, 453.
159. 2004 WL 1646356, at *6-9 (6th Cir. Jul. 26, 2004) (affirming judgment
of district court in government's civil action against Rapanos).

160. Id. at *6.
161. Id. at *6-8.
162. 335 F.3d at 604. See Krilich, 303 F.3d at 791 (construing SWANCC
narrowly in an action to vacate a consent decree in the Seventh Circuit).
163. Reuth, 335 F.3d at 603. Also, unlike Deaton and Rapanos, which were

enforcement actions by the ACOE, the consent decree in Reuth stemmed from
an EPA enforcement action. Id. at 600-01. Consequently, 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)
was construed by Reuth, rather than 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a). Id. at 601.

164. Id. at 603.
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the consent decree had been based on both "adjacent to""
jurisdiction and "effect on interstate commerce " " jurisdiction."'
Reuth did not address the continued vitality of "effect on interstate
commerce" jurisdiction" because it held that SWANCC "did not
affect the law regarding [adjacency jurisdiction]. " 69

Indeed, the

Reuth court noted that SWANCC "did not address [adjacency] at
all."7' Consequently, under Reuth, it appears that the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals has essentially adopted Headwaters's
narrow interpretation of SWANCC."7'
D. The Fifth CircuitCourt of Appeals Continues
to Construe SWANCC Broadly

On December 16, 2003, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
decided United States v. Needham, which reaffirmed Rice's narrow
interpretation of SWANCC.172 Like Rice, Needham involved the

OPA, which "imposes strict liability upon parties that discharge oil
into 'navigable waters,' a term defined in the statute to mean 'the
waters of the United States...

."'

Needham noted that the

OPA's definition of "navigable waters" is "co-extensive with the
definition found in the [CWA] ."17 Although Needham sheds some
light on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals's interpretation of the
CWA's post-SWANCC scope, its statements with respect to the
CWA, like similar pronouncements in Rice, are dicta.'75
165. Id. at 601. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(7).
166. Reuth, 335 F.3d at 601. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3).
167. Reuth, 335 F.3d at 601.
168. Id. at 603-04 (stating in dicta that, under SWANCC's reasoning, 40
C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3)'s "effect on interstate commerce" jurisdiction appears
doomed because it suffers from the same infirmity as the MBR, no nexus to
navigability).
169. Id. at 604.
170. Id.
171. Cf id. at 604 (discussing Riverside and Deaton). In any event, it
appears that, under Reuth and Krilich, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
will eventually rule that the ACOE has jurisdiction over a body of water or
wetland that has a hydrological connection to a navigable water. Indeed, a
district court within the Seventh Circuit recently upheld CWA jurisdiction
based upon a hydrological connection between a wetland adjacent to a nonnavigable tributary of a navigable water based on its interpretation of, inter
aha, Reuth, Rapanos and Deaton. See Thorson, 2004 WL 737522 at *13
("Although the court's statements about adjacency in Reuth were dicta and
therefore not binding, I agree that the reasoning in Deaton (and Rapanos) is
persuasive and that SWANCC does not foreclose the hydrological connection
standard for determining adjacency.").
172. 354 F.3d at 344-47.
173. Id. at 342, 344.
174. Id. at 344 (citing Rice, 250 F.3d at 267).
175. See Wood, supra note 15, at 10188 ("[Olne can only conclude from the
emphatic dicta in the Needham and Rice decisions that the Fifth Circuit is
likely to adopt a narrow interpretation of CWA jurisdiction whenever a case
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Needham Resources, Inc., a company owned by James and
Janell Needham, was responsible for an oil spill.17 The EPA and
the U.S. Coast Guard ultimately cleaned up the spill and
subsequently attempted to recover the response costs from the
The day before the Coast Guard filed suit, the
Needhams.'
Needhams filed for bankruptcy protection. 7 ' While litigating the
government's claims in the bankruptcy court, the parties
stipulated that the oil, which was originally discharged into the
drainage ditch at Thibodeaux Well, spilled into Bayou Cutoff, and
then into Bayou Folse. Bayou Folse flows directly into the
Company Canal, an industrial waterway that eventually flows into
the Gulf of Mexico. 179
The EPA filed a proof of claim, which the bankruptcy court
denied on the ground that "neither the drainage ditch nor Bayou
Cutoff are navigable waters as that term is defined in the OPA nor
are they sufficiently adjacent to the navigable waters to support
an extension of the OPA."" The bankruptcy court was affirmed on
appeal by the district court. 8' The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
however,
reversed and remanded the case to the bankruptcy
2
court.11

The Needham court rejected the government's argument that
the OPA covered "all waters, excluding groundwater, that have
any hydrological connection with 'navigable water.""" In doing so,
the court noted that its decision was contrary to recent decisions
by the Fourth and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals in Deaton and
Rapanos respectively." Needham stated that "[tihe CWA and the
OPA are not so broad as to permit the federal government to
impose regulations over 'tributaries' that are neither themselves
eventually is decided by that court of appeals requiring an actual holding of
law governing the subject."). Cf Woodley/Grumbles Testimony, supra note 6
("Two Fifth Circuit decisions, although not squarely in conflict with the other
Circuits, reasoned in non-binding discussion that SWANCC narrowed
jurisdiction over tributaries to include waters that are actually navigable or
waters adjacent to an open body of navigable water.").
176. Needham, 354 F.3d at 343.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. In re Needham, 279 B.R. at 519.
181. Needham, 2002 WL 1162790 at *1.
182. Needham, 354 F.3d at 347.
183. Id. at 345 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 300.5 (2003)).
184. Id. at 345. See also Mank, supra note 11, at 820 (discussing Needham
and noting that it confirmed the Fifth Circuit's "narrow interpretation of the
[CWAI in light of SWANCC and explicitly rejected the narrow interpretation
SWANCC and broad interpretation of the [CWAI recently adopted by the
Fourth and Sixth Circuits"); Wood, supra note 15, at 10189 (noting that
Needham "boldly declares that the CWA's existing jurisdiction is limited to

open bodies of actually navigable waters, plus any water body immediately
adjacent, i.e., immediately proximate, to actually navigable open waters").
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navigable nor truly adjacent to navigable waters. " "
Although the court of appeals, like the bankruptcy court,
followed Rice, it nonetheless found the bankruptcy court's factual
findings to be clearly erroneous. Based on the parties' stipulated
facts, the court of appeals found that it was clearly erroneous for
the bankruptcy court to find (1) "that the oil spilled only into the
drainage ditch adjacent to the Thibodeaux Well and Bayou
Cutoff," and (2) "that the Gulf of Mexico was the only open body of
navigable water in the vicinity of the spill."1" The court of appeals
noted that the Needhams "acknowledged that the residue from the
spill was found 10 to 12 miles from the oil well, i.e., in Bayou
Folse."87 Accordingly, it found that "Bayou Folse is adjacent to an
open body of navigable water, namely the Company Canal.""
Having found that the OPA jurisdiction existed over the water
polluted by the Needhams, i.e., Bayou Folse, the court of appeals
remanded so that the bankruptcy court could consider the
Needhams' other defenses."
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Needham is somewhat
contradictory. On the one hand, the court noted that "[ulnder
Rice, the term 'adjacent' cannot include every possible source of
water that eventually flows into a navigable-in-fact waterway.
Rather, adjacency necessarily implicates a 'significant nexus'
between the water in question and the navigable-in-fact
waterway.""9
On the other hand, the court found that the
pollution of Bayou Folse, which was between ten and twelve miles
away from the oil spill, was sufficient to establish OPA jurisdiction
because it was adjacent to a navigable water, i.e., the Company
Canal. In other words, although Needham stated that jurisdiction
under the CWA and OPA does not extend to "'tributaries' that are
neither themselves navigable nor truly adjacent to navigable
waters," it held that OPA jurisdiction existed where oil pollution
traveled via several non-navigable tributaries, over a course of
between ten and twelve miles, into a body of water that was
adjacent to a navigable water. 9
To reconcile Needham's

185. Needham, 354 F.3d at 345 (following Rice, 250 F.3d at 269). Needham
construed SWANCC as extending CWA jurisdiction only to waters that are
"actually navigable or adjacent to an open body of navigable water." Id. at
345-46. As noted below, however, Rice's interpretation of SWANCC is
erroneous because SWANCC referred to any waters adjacent to any
jurisdictional waters, not just navigable ones. See supra note 61. Needham

therefore merely further promulgated this error. Cf. Rapanos II, at *6-8
(rejecting Needham's "direct abuttment" requirement).
186. Needham, 354 F.3d at 346 (citing In re Needham, 279 B.R. at 516-17).

187. Id. (citing In re Needham, 279 B.R. at 518).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 347.
190. Id. (citing SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167).
191. Compare id. at 345, with id. at 346-47.
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ostensible inconsistency, it appears that the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals will find federal jurisdiction where pollution actually
travels through a system of non-navigable tributaries, but that
federal jurisdiction will not exist absent such a factual finding."9
V. THE JURY IS IN -

SWANCC DID NOT

SIGNIFICANTLY ALTER THE CWA

The majority of federal courts that have addressed the scope
of SWANCC have construed it narrowly, finding that SWANCC
did not alter the CWA beyond invalidating the MBR.193 The
majority view is consistent with the narrow interpretation of
SWANCC adopted by the ACOE and the EPA under the Clinton
Indeed, where a hydrological
and Bush Administrations."'

192. Needham thus appears to be consistent with Rapanos and Deaton to the
extent that it would extend CWA jurisdiction to an oil spill in a non-navigable
tributary that travels to a navigable water or water adjacent thereto.
193. See supra Parts III and IV; supra note 6 (suggesting that the Supreme
Court has implicitly endorsed the narrow interpretation of SWANCC adopted
by Deaton, Rapanos, and Newdunn); Kunz, supra note 5, at 463; 2003 Joint
Memorandum, 68 Fed. Reg at 1996 ("[A] majority of cases hold that SWANCC
applies only to waters that are isolated, intrastate and non-navigable.. ..");
Fitzgerald, supra note 14, at 70 (same); Wood, supra note 15, at 10189 (noting
that "most federal courts have read the SWANCC decision narrowly [because
its] obiter dicta seems ill-considered, unsupported by precedent or other legal
authority, and generally unconvincing"); id. at 10215.
[All four of the courts of appeals that have directly addressed the
question of post-SWANCC CWA jurisdiction have agreed, without the
filing of a single dissenting opinion, that the SWANCC decision's
holding was narrow, and that the entire tributary system of the § 10
navigable waters is still subject to the important protections of the
CWA.
Id. Nonetheless, as noted above, SWANCC may call into question the viability
of "effect on commerce" connections that are unrelated to navigability. See
supra note 166.
194. On January 19, 2001, days after SWANCC was decided, the ACOE and
the EPA issued a joint memorandum in the waning days of the Clinton
Administration stating that "most CWA jurisdiction remains basically intact
after the SWANCC decision." See 2001 Joint Memorandum, supra note 47, at
5; Downing, supra note 3, at 489 (discussing the 2001 Joint Memorandum).
On January 15, 2003, the ACOE and the EPA under the Bush Administration
issued guidance that superceded the 2001 Joint Memorandum. See 2003 Joint
Memorandum, 68 Fed. Reg. at 1995.
Nonetheless, the 2003 Joint
Memorandum also adopted a narrow (albeit slightly broader) interpretation of
SWANCC, noting that it eliminated "CWA jurisdiction over isolated waters
that are intrastate and non-navigable, where the sole basis for asserting CWA
jurisdiction is the actual or potential use of the waters as habitat for migratory
birds .... Id. at 1996. See also infra notes 264-268 (discussing the 2003 Joint
Memorandum). Moreover, on December 16, 2003 the ACOE and the EPA
announced that the Bush Administration was abandoning plans to issue a rule
clarifying the scope of the CWA with respect to isolated waters. Effort to
Define U.S. Waters Dropped, EPA, Corps to Retain 2003 Guidance, 72
U.S.L.W. 2361 (2003) [hereinafter BNA]; Eric Pianin, EPA Scraps Changes to
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connection exists to a navigable water, most courts permit the
ACOE to exercise "adjacency" jurisdiction under the CWA
pursuant to 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)(2) and (5).195 These courts hold that
SWANCC's "significant nexus" is satisfied by a hydrological
connection to a navigable water, even where the connection is
several times removed from the navigable water and where the
navigable water is miles away." Indeed, SWANCC did not alter
the ACOE's authority to regulate "waters of the United States"
that serve as channels of interstate commerce, as opposed to
ACOE regulation of waters based on their possible effect on
interstate commerce.'97
Consequently, pre-SWANCC decisions
regarding CWA jurisdiction based on a hydrological connection
remain valid.'

Clean Water Act, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2003, at A20 (noting that the EPA
stated that it reads SWANCC "narrowly").
195. See supra Parts III and IV; see also BNA, 72 U.S.L.W. at 2362 (noting
that an EPA administrator stated that "[olur reading of the case law to date is
that if there is a hydrological connection between wetlands resources and
waters of the United States, that makes [the wetlands] jurisdictional"); Wood,
supra note 15, at 10189 (contending that "the CWA's jurisdiction over nonnavigable tributaries and their adjacent wetlands remains intact despite the
Court's SWANCC decision and those who would exaggerate the implications of
its obiter dicta"); id. at 10214-15 n.140 (setting forth the test for hydrological
connectivity adopted by appellate courts that have addressed the scope of the
CWA after SWANCC); 2003 Joint Memorandum, 68 Fed. Reg. at 1997 ("A
number of court decisions have held that SWANCC does not change the
principle that CWA jurisdiction extends to tributaries of navigable waters.");
id. at 1998 (directing ACOE and EPA field staff to "continue to assert
jurisdiction over traditional navigable waters (and adjacent wetlands) and,
generally speaking, their tributary systems (and adjacent wetlands)").
196. See supra Parts III-IV; Hummel, 2003 WL 1845365 at *6-7; Jones, 267
F. Supp. 2d at 1357-60.
197. See supra note 75. Although SWANCC only invalidated the MBR, the
continued viability of 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) as a basis for CWA jurisdiction is
questionable. See ANPRM, 68 Fed. Reg. at 1994; 2003 Joint Memorandum, 68
Fed. Reg. at 1996; Buday, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 1287 ("Even though [SWANCC]
did not strike any part of 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3), the decision raises serious
questions about the continued viability of that subsection."). Cf Reuth, 335
F.3d at 603-04 (stating in dicta that, under SWANCC's reasoning, 40 C.F.R.
§ 230.3(s)(3)'s "effect on interstate commerce" jurisdiction appears doomed
because it suffers from the same infirmity as the MBR, no nexus to
navigability).
198. See TGR, 171 F.3d at 765 (holding that CWA jurisdiction extends to
tributaries of navigable waters); Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1341-42 (same); Pozsgai,
999 F.2d 719 (same); FD&P, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 516-17 (same). See also Jones,
267 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 (holding that Eidson was not affected by SWANCC);
2001 Joint Memorandum, supra note 47, at 6 (noting that, after SWANCC,
Riverside continues to allow the EPA and the ACOE "to assert CWA
jurisdiction over, inter alia, all of the traditional navigable waters, all
interstate waters, and all tributaries to navigable or interstate waters,
upstream to the highest reaches of the tributary systems, and over all
wetlands adjacent to any and all of those waters").
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In light of Rapanos, Deaton, Newdunn, and Reuth, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals's position, as reflected in Rice and
Needham, represents the minority view.
Courts have largely
refused to follow Rice because it involved discharges made on land
(i.e., into groundwater), rendering its statement regarding the
scope of SWANCC dicta. °° Courts that have construed Rice (and
hence SWANCC) broadly, such as FD&P, °1 have done so in error
because Rice involved no hydrological connection to a navigable
water." ' Despite the number of cases interpreting SWANCC, no
decision has "focused on the jurisdictional status of an isolated
intrastate non-navigable water - the type of waters at issue in...
SWANCC." 2° Consequently, it is unclear what circumstances, if
any, would establish a significant nexus between isolated waters
and navigable waters. °4 In sum, although most courts that have
addressed SWANCC have construed it narrowly, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals ostensibly holds the contrary view and several
questions stemming from SWANCC remain unanswered.
Accordingly, SWANCC will continue to provide grist for litigation
in lower federal courts.

199. See Rapanos II, at *6-8 (noting the court's disagreement with Needham
concerning CWA's "adjacency" requirement); Thorson, 2004 WL 737522 at *1314 (following the majority trend as espoused in Deaton and Rapanos and
declining to follow the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' decisions in Rice and
Needham); supra note 6 (noting that the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
Deaton, Rapanos, and Newdunn, decisions that reject Rice and which
Needham declined to follow). Moreover, as noted above, Needham held that
OPA jurisdiction existed where there was a hydrological connection between
an oil spill and a navigable water that was ten to twelve miles and several
non-navigable tributaries away. See supra notes 185-187.
200. Hummel, 2003 WL 1845365 at *6 (noting that Rice's statements with
respect to SWANCC were dicta because Rice involved groundwater discharges
and that the Rice "court had no occasion to discuss the limits of the Corps'
jurisdiction over waters with observable connections to navigable waters");
Lamplight, 2002 WL 360652 at *5 ("As Plaintiff points out, the Fifth Circuit's
statement [in Rice] is probably only dicta: the landowners who sought recovery
from an alleged upstream polluter in that case were unsuccessful because
there was evidence only of oil discharge onto dry land rather than into any
body of surface water."). See Wood, supra note 15, at 10188, 10190 (noting
that "the Fifth Circuit's dicta in Rice and Needham... is supported by very
little other than ipse dixit").
201. 239 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
202. Jones, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 1359 n.7 (discussing Rice, 250 F.3d at 271).
Unlike Rice, Needham involved a hydrological connection between a polluted
water and a navigable water. Nonetheless, as noted above, Needham held
that federal regulatory jurisdiction existed, despite having rejected the federal
government's ability to regulate all waters other than groundwater
hydrologically connected to a navigable water. See supra note 196.
203. Downing, supra note 3, at 491.
204. Id.
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VI. A LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO SWANCC?: CONGRESS SHOULD
ENACT THE CLEAN WATER AUTHORITY RESTORATION ACT

Wetlands perform many valuable functions, including
maintaining the integrity of America's drinking water, flood
control, and biodiversity."' The nation lost a great number of
wetlands before the CWA was enacted and continues to lose up to
300,000 acres of wetlands each year.2"
These losses "have
significantly reduced important wildlife habitat, especially
waterfowl breeding and migration habitat.""7 Likewise, isolated
wetlands serve many important functions2 ° and are especially
important in arid regions of the country such as the southwest and
the west coast.
Although SWANCC has been construed narrowly by most
courts addressing the issue, it has nonetheless adversely impacted
wetlands regulation..2 "

First, SWANCC has likely eliminated

205. See Leibowitz & Nadeau, supra note 7, at 669-71 (discussing the
functions of isolated wetlands including protecting the water quality of
navigable waters and preserving habitats); Van Balen, supra note 23, at 846
(characterizing wetlands as "ecologically essential"); Oliver A. Houck &
Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A Consideration of
Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Programsto the States,
54 MD. L. REV. 1242, 1245-53 (1995) (discussing wetland functions). For
example, the "loss of fifty percent of America's remaining wetlands would
result in increased sewage treatment plant expenditures of up to $75 billion
for the removal of a single pollutant, nitrogen, alone." Id. at 1245. Moreover,
wetlands' biomass generates "[more than seventy percent of America's
commercial seafood harvest, with an estimated annual value of $3.6 billion
and total economic output of $31 billion. ... " Id. at 1247. Indeed, the value of
wetlands cannot be overstated.
206. Fitzgerald, supra note 14, at 55 n.369 (noting that "[olut of the 221
million acres of wetlands that once existed in the [continental] U.S.," only 103
million acres remain today and that eighty-seven percent of these losses
occurred from the 1950s to the 1970s); Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands,
Waterfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause Jurisdictionand
the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 ENVTL. L. 1, 22 nn.163-64 (1999)
[hereinafter Adler, Commerce Clause Jurisdiction](noting that estimates of
annual wetland losses range between 117,000 and 300,000 acres).
207. Tiner, GeographicallyIsolated Wetlands, supra note 52, at 500.
208. Talene Nicole Megerian, Federal Regulation of Isolated Wetlands: To Be
or Not To Be, 13 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 157, 169-71 (2002) (discussing the
importance of isolated wetlands).
209. Leibowitz & Nadeau, supra note 7, at 666-67; Tiner, Geographically
Isolated Wetlands, supra note 52, at 496-97.
210. Ralph W. Tiner, Estimated Extent of GeographicallyIsolated Wetlands
in Selected Areas of the United States, 23 WETLANDS 636, 650-51 (2003)
[hereinafter Tiner, Estimated Extent] (noting that SWANCC has lessened
protections afforded to isolated wetlands but that its impact will be mitigated
if SWANCC is interpreted narrowly - i.e., as having only struck down the
MBR); Fitzgerald, supra note 14, at 68. Consequently, SWANCC has been the
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CWA jurisdiction over a substantial amount of wetlands that
provide numerous ecological functions. Although no one knows
what percentage of wetlands are "isolated,"11 it is estimated that
twenty percent of the wetlands in the continental United States
are isolated and thus unprotected by the CWA after SWANCC."'

subject of criticism. See, e.g., id. at 11-12 (opining that SWANCC was "not a
positive sign for the future of environmental law" and suggesting, inter alia,
that the SWANCC Court "did not follow the text, intent, or purposes of the
CWA, which clearly establishes broad federal jurisdiction").
211. Leibowitz & Nadeau, supra note 7, at 666 ("The number and area of
isolated wetlands occurring nationally is not known."); id. at 675 ("Estimating
the potential impact of SWANCC requires knowledge of how many isolated
wetlands there are to begin with [which] ...is not known."); id. at 676
(discussing the factors that need to be addressed in ascertaining the number of
wetlands jeopardized by SWANCC, including state laws protecting isolated
wetlands). This ignorance stems from the amorphous meaning of "isolated
wetland." The scientific and regulatory communities lack a uniform definition
of "isolated wetlands." Id. at 664-65 (noting that no regulatory definition has
been promulgated by either the EPA or the ACOE and that scientists proffer
several definitions). Although "isolated waters" has not been defined by either
the EPA or the ACOE for jurisdictional purposes, the ACOE did define it for
purposes of NWP 26 as "non-tidal waters of the United States that are (1) not
part of a surface tributary system to interstate or navigable waters of the
United States; and (2) not adjacent to such tributary waters." Id. at 665
(quoting 33 C.F.R. § 330.2(e)). NWP 26 expired in 2000. Id. The NWP 26
definition is essentially the hydrological connection definition adopted by the
majority of post-SWANCC decisions. Although scientists proffer several
definitions, they generally agree that "isolated wetlands" are not completely
isolated from other aquatic systems. Id. at 668-69. Indeed, some wetland
scientists state that "geographically isolated wetlands are best understood as
occurring within an isolation-connectivity continuum that has both hydrologic
[such as groundwater] and biotic expressions." Id. at 669. As noted above, the
SWANCC dissenters construed Riverside as extending CWA jurisdiction to
waters with an ecological or hydrological connection to jurisdictional waters and that most isolated waters probably have such an ecological connection.
See supra note 46.
212. Leibowitz & Nadeau, supra note 7, at 666 (noting that one commentator
estimated "that no more than 20% of the wetland area in the contiguous U.S.
is isolated"); Mank, supra note 11, at 816 (noting that the ANPRM "provoked
concerns among environmentalists that approximately twenty percent of all
wetlands, totaling about twenty million acres, will be classified as 'isolated,'
and hence beyond federal jurisdiction"). See Fitzgerald, supra note 14, at 12
n.6, 69 (citing Kusler Memorandum, supra note 23, which estimated that forty
to sixty percent of the nation's wetlands are jeopardized by SWANCC);
Leibowitz & Nadeau, supra note 7, at 666-67 (noting that a geographic
information system (GIS) study of seventy-two wetland sites indicated that
isolated wetlands comprised twenty-six percent of the average site); id. at 676
(noting that the GIS study may underestimate how many wetlands are
isolated inasmuch as it excluded non-adjacent wetlands that may nonetheless
be jurisdictional where a hydrological connection exists). But see Tiner,
Estimated Extent, supra note 210, at 636, 651 (noting that "estimates of
isolated wetlands [in the GIS study] cannot be readily translated to wetlands
that have lost Clean Water Act 'protection' [after SWANCC]"). As noted
above, most circuits to have addressed the issue extend CWA jurisdiction over
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In any event, several ACOE and EPA regulators have noted that:
Even if construed narrowly, SWANCC can have an enormous effect
on the ability of the CWA to protect the Nation's aquatic resources.
-If the decision results in the destruction of only one percent of
wetlands that remain in the lower forty-eight states, that loss would
be greater than all wetlands lost over the past decade. 213
Moreover, "the magnitude of functional loss is not
proportional to size" of an isolated wetland.214 In other words, the
loss of a relatively modest amount of isolated wetlands may result
in a substantial loss of wetland function.
Second, ACOE Districts have made varying post-SWANCC
jurisdictional determinations.21
The resulting regulatory
uncertainty may encourage zealous developers and would-be
polluters to attempt to push the envelope in some ACOE
districts."6 Moreover, uniformity of regulatory application is
desirable in and of itself. Indeed, interested entities must address
a patchwork of regulatory interpretations,217 thereby increasing
costs and decreasing predictability. Therefore, although SWANCC
did not significantly alter the CWA, it did jeopardize a significant
number of wetlands.2"'
Consequently, Congress should rectify
non-adjacent wetlands that are hydrologically connected to a navigable water.
Consequently, it appears that SWANCC has jeopardized twenty percent of the
wetlands in the continental United States. Fitzgerald, supra note 14, at 69
(citing Kusler Memorandum, supra note 23). It follows that a higher relative
percentage of wetlands are at risk in the states comprising the Fifth Circuit
(Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas).
213. Downing, supra note 3, at 492.
214. See Scott G. Leibowitz, Isolated Wetlands and their Functions: An
Ecological Perspective, 23 WETLANDS 517, 524 (2003).
215. GAO Report, supra note 19, at 2-3 (concluding that ACOE "districts

differ in how they interpret and apply the federal regulations when
determining what wetlands and other waters fall within the [CWA]
jurisdiction of the federal government," including determinations regarding
jurisdiction over (1) adjacent wetlands, (2) tributaries, and (3) ditches and
manmade conveyances); Leibowitz & Nadeau, supra note 7, at 675; Kunz,
supra note 5, at 488; Calderon, supra note 55, at 320-21.
216. National Wildlife Federation, GAO Report Exposes Sweeping Lapses in
Corps' CWA Enforcement (Mar. 9, 2004), available at http://www.nwf.org/news/
story.cfm?pageld=2FCDD1A0-65BF-09FE-BB82743180E77594 (Mar. 9, 2004)
(noting that "many developers are no longer checking with the [ACOE] to see
if a permit is even required"). Cf Boudreaux, supra note 3, at 575.
217. GAO Report, supra note 19, at 14 (noting that building interests believe
that SWANCC has created "uncertainty, resulting in unequal treatment and
significant financial burden to the regulated community"); Tiner, Estimated
Extent, supra note 210, at 636, 640, 650-51 (noting that SWANCC has resulted
in "a lack of national [regulatory] consistency" that exacerbates pre-existing
variation among ACOE districts).
218. ANPRM, 68 Fed. Reg. at 1994 ("Preliminary assessments of potential
resource impacts vary widely depending on the scenarios considered.") (citing
Ducks Unlimited, The SWANCC Decision: Implications for Wetlands and
Waterfowl at httpJ/www.ducks.org/conservation/404_report.asp (Sept. 2001);
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SWANCC's potential harm by amending the CWA to expressly
give the ACOE the authority to regulate "isolated" wetlands.219
In response to SWANCC, the Clean Water Authority
Restoration Act of 2002 (the "CWARA of 2002") was introduced,
but not enacted, by the 107th Congress.22 ° This bill would have,
Association of State Wetland Managers, SWANCC Decision and the State
Regulation of Wetlands at http://www.aswm.org/fwp/swancc/aswm-int.pdf)
(June 2001).
219. The states are also free to fill in any legislative gaps left by SWANCC.
State legislative responses to SWANCC are beyond the scope of this Article
and are discussed elsewhere.
See Ostergren, supra note 7, at 434-42
(discussing Minnesota's legislative response to SWANCC); Pyle, supra note 4,
at 91 (discussing various state responses to SWANCC as well as a Model Sate
Wetland Protection Act proposed by the Association of State Wetland
Managers); Kusler Memorandum, supra note 23 (discussing SWANCC's
impact on state regulation of wetlands and options available to the states);
Craig, supra note 23, at 137 (listing fifteen states that have regulatory
programs that address isolated wetlands and two additional states that
enacted such programs in response to SWANCC); Fitzgerald, supra note 14, at
71 (same); Riverkeeper, New York State Wetlands Legislation Proposed, at
http://www.riverkeeper.org/campaign.php/watershed/you can do/672
(last
visited June 11, 2004) (discussing a bill in the New York legislature to enact
the Clean Water Protection/Flood Prevention Act, which would regulate
isolated wetlands in response to SWANCC). Nonetheless, state legislative
responses may be inadequate because of interstate externalities, i.e., the
burden of state regulation will only be felt locally whereas the benefit will be
felt nationally. Houck & Rolland, supra note 205, at 1253 (noting that state
and federal regulation is required to adequately protect wetlands because
aggregate losses have interstate ramifications); Wood, supra note 15, at 10194
(noting that, before the CWA was enacted, "state and local governments had
proven themselves both incapable of and unwilling to control water pollution"
because of the "'transboundary' nature of water pollution" and a "race to the
bottom" of state environmental de-regulation). But see Jonathan H. Adler, The
Duck Stops Here? The Environmental Challenge to Federalism, 9 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 205, 207-08 (2001) [hereinafter Adler, The Duck Stops Here?]
(noting that interstate externalities may "justify federal environmental
regulation," but concluding that "such externalities often are overstated, and
the costs of addressing such externalities through federal regulation may well
exceed the benefits of maintaining state primacy").
Moreover, budgetstrapped states generally prefer to have their wetland resources protected by
federal agencies. See GAO Report, supra note 19, at 14 (noting that forty-one
of the forty-three states that submitted comments in response to the ANPRM
"were concerned about any major reduction in [CWA] jurisdiction"); Rebecca R.
Wodder, Administration's Reversal on Excluding Wetlands, Streams from
Clean Water Act Offers Chance to Reverse Decline in Water Quality, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, Dec. 17, 2003, availableat 2003 WL 64751052 (noting that thirtynine states opposed proposed rule-making that would decrease CWA
jurisdiction).
Consequently, federal protection of wetland resources is
necessary to adequately protect wetland resources.
220. See Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 2002, S. 2780, 107th
Cong., 2d Sess. (2002); Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 2002, H.R.
5194, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002). See also Kunz, supra note 5, at 485-90
(discussing the Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 2002); Duquet,
supra note 23, at 376-77 (same); Fitzgerald, supra note 14, at 70 n.503 (same).
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inter alia, deleted the term "navigable" from the CWA, thereby
codifying the ACOE's regulations defining "waters of the United
States." ' ' Consequently, it would have restored CWA jurisdiction
22
to its pre-SWANCC status."
The 108th Congress reintroduced the CWARA of 2002 as the
Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 2003 (the CWARA").na
Like its predecessor, the CWARA would delete the term
"navigable" from the CWA and codify the ACOE's regulations
defining "waters of the United States. " 4 The CWARA contains
various congressional
findings ostensibly responding
to
SWANCC. 25 For example, the CWARA states, inter alia, that
pollution of intrastate waters may affect waters of the United
States.26 Consequently, the CWARA would be based in part upon
Congress's commerce power over channels of commerce, a power
that has repeatedly been affirmed by post-SWANCC case law. 27 It

would also be predicated upon Congress's commerce power over

Inasmuch as Senate Bill 2780 and House Bill 5194 are verbatim, they will be
collectively referred to as the CWARA of 2002.
221. H.R. 5194, § 4; S. 2780, § 4; Kunz, supra note 5, at 486-87; Duquet,
supra note 23, at 376-77. See Philip Lammens, Note, Section 404(a) of the
Clean Water Act: the Army Corps of Engineers' Jurisdiction over "All Other
Waters", 54 FLA. L. REV. 147, 172-73 (2002) (proposing that the CWA should
be amended by, inter alia, replacing "navigable waters" with "waters of the
United States" and adopting the ACOE's and EPA's regulatory definitions).
222. Kunz, supra note 5, at 486-87.
223. Compare Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 2003, S. 473, 108th
Cong., 1st Sess. (2003), and Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 2003,
H.R. 962, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003), with S. 2780, and H.R. 5194.
Inasmuch as S. 473 and H.R. 962 are verbatim, they will be collectively
referred to as the CWARA.
224. See S. 473, §§ 4-5; H.R. 962, §§ 4-5; Federal Jurisdiction of Navigable
Waters Under Clean Waters: Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife and
Water of the Senate Comm. on Envrtl. & Public Works, 108th Cong. (2003)

(statement of Richard Hamann, Associate in Law, University of Florida),
available at 2003 WL 56335161. Cf Kunz, supra note 5, at 486-87 (discussing
the corresponding sections of the CWARA of 2002).
225. Despite the substantive similarity between the CWARA and the
CWARA of 2002, the congressional findings for these bills were different.
Compare S. 473, § 3(1)-(17), and H.R. 962, § 3(1)-(17), with S. 2780, § 2(1)-(32),
and H.R. 5194, § 2(1)-(32).
226. S. 473, § 3(4) ("Water is transported through interconnected hydrologic
cycles, and the pollution, impairment, or destruction of any part of an aquatic
system may affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other
parts of the aquatic system."); H.R. 962, § 3(4) (same); S. 473, § 3(5)
("Protection of intrastate waters, along with other waters of the United States,
is necessary to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of all waters in the United States."); H.R. 962, § 3(5) (same); S.473,
§ 3(6) ("The regulation of discharges of pollutants into interstate and
intrastate waters is an integral part of the comprehensive clean water
regulatory program of the United States."); H.R. 962, § 3(6) (same).
227. See supra Parts III-IV.
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activities that affect interstate or foreign commerce."B If enacted,
the CWARA would "provide protection to the waters of the United
States to the fullest extent of the legislative authority of Congress
under the Constitution."129 The CWARA would thus extend CWA
jurisdiction over isolated intrastate waters based solely on the
presence of migratory birds. 2 ° Accordingly, the CWARA would
eventually force the Supreme Court to address whether the
Commerce Clause gives Congress the authority to regulate
intrastate wetlands, a question left unanswered by SWANCC.231
Enforcement of the CWARA based upon Congress's commerce
power over channels of commerce would likely be upheld. To the
extent, however, that the CWARA is based upon Congress's power
to regulate intrastate activities that affect interstate or foreign
commerce, it would be more controversial, potentially challenging
the Rehnquist Court to continue a trend towards curtailing the
reach of the Commerce Clause started by United States v. Lopez2 2
and continuing in United States v. Morrison. 3 Although the
228. See, e.g., S. 473, § 3(8)-(13); H.R. 962, § 3(8)-(13). Cf Kunz, supra note
5, at 486-87.
229. S. 473, § 2(3); H.R. 962, § 2(3); See Philip Weinberg, It's Time for
Congress to Rearm the Army Corps of Engineers:A Response to the Solid Waste
Agency Decision, 20 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 531, 532-33 (2001) (suggesting that, in
response to SWANCC, Congress should enact legislation clarifying and
"restat[ing] its intention to assert broad federal jurisdiction under the
[CWA]").
230. H.R. 962, § 3(12) ("Millions of people in the United States enjoy
recreational activities that depend on intrastate waters, such as waterfowl
hunting, bird watching, fishing, and photography and other graphic arts, and
those activities and associated travel generate billions of dollars of income
each year for the travel, tourism, recreation, and sporting sectors of the
economy of the United States."); S. 473, § 3(12) (same). One commentator has
suggested that the CWA should be amended to explicitly establish CWA
jurisdiction over intrastate wetlands based on the presence of migratory birds.
See Edward Alburo Morrissey, The Jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act Over

Isolated Wetlands: The Migratory Bird Rule, 22 J. LEGIS. 137, 143 (1996).
231. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173-174; Ostergren, supra note 7, at 396 ("The
central issue left unresolved by SWANCC is whether and to what extent the
Corps may assert jurisdiction over isolated wetlands based on a connection to
interstate commerce rather than navigation.").
232. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1995) (holding that the
Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause power
because possessing a gun near a school is not an economic activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce); id. at 558 (holding that Congress
could exercise its commerce power over (1) the channels of interstate
commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and (3) activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce).
233. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (holding that the
Violence Against Women Act's civil remedy provision exceeded Congress's
Commerce Clause power because gender motivated violence is not economic
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce). See Kunz, supra note
5, at 467-70 (discussing SWANCC in light of Lopez and Morrison); Fitzgerald,
supra note 14, at 11-12 (noting that the Rehnquist Court is resurrecting
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Supreme Court declined to address the Commerce Clause issue in
SWANCC, commentators debate the future viability of federal
environmental laws predicated upon this aspect of the Commerce
Clause.2" Nonetheless, the Commerce Clause remains, at present,
a valid basis for extending CWA jurisdiction over "isolated"
wetlands. 35 In addition to the Commerce Clause, the CWARA is
federalism in its Commerce Clause cases); Adler, supra note 219, at 208
(opining that the Supreme Court will eventually "have to confront the
constitutional issue that it avoided in SWANCC"); Walston, supra note 11, at
742 (noting that "Lopez, Morrison, and SWANCC may have a major impact on
the constitutionality of Congress's environmental laws"); Adler, supra note 206
at 5 ("In the wake of the Lopez decision, commentators noted that federal
wetlands regulation was one of the federal environmental programs most
vulnerable to a Commerce Clause challenge.").
234. Compare Duquet, supra note 23, at 372 ("[Flootnote three [in SWANCCI
calls into question every agency regulation that does not have at least some
connection with the regulation of navigation."), and Robert H. Bork & Daniel
E. Troy, Locating the Boundaries: the Scope of Congress's Power to Regulate
Commerce, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 849, 853-54 (2002) ("Environmental
issues that are national but not commercial do not seem, as an original
matter, appropriate for national resolution under the commerce power. This
does not mean that courts or legislators should treat existing federal
environmental legislation as unconstitutional.
Rather, existing statutes
should be interpreted against a background that respects federalism concerns
to the extent possible."), and Jamie Y. Tanabe, Comment, The Commerce
Clause Pendulum: Will Federal Environmental Law Survive in the PostSWANCC Epoch of "New Federalism"?, 31 ENVTL. L. 1051, 1083 (2001)
(opining that SWANCC imperiled the ACOE's "jurisdiction over adjacent
wetlands"), with Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional
Federalism: Power and Perspective in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 1199, 1227 (2003) ("The [SWANCC] Court's concern about
constitutional boundaries is surprising, given the regulations' substantial
commercial nexus... [with] a municipal landfill... [and] a multibillion dollar
industry of hunting and bird watching."), and Kunz, supra note 5, at 493
(noting that the Supreme Court denied certiorari less than two months after
SWANCC for a decision by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejecting a
Commerce Clause challenge to the Endangered Species Act and opining that
other federal environmental regulations would not necessarily fall prey to
Commerce Clause challenges), and Peter Arey Gilbert, Note, The Migratory
Bird Rule After Lopez: Questioning the Value of State Sovereignty in the
Context of Wetland Regulation, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1695, 1739 (1998)
(concluding that "[tihe MBR represents a valid expression of congressional
commerce power even after the Lopez decision"), and White & Douglas, supra
note 23, at 18-21 (noting that "it remains uncertain whether the Supreme
Court would sustain the [MBR] on Commerce Clause grounds" but arguing
that the Court should do so for policy reasons and because it is consistent with
Lopez).
235. Sam Saad, Commerce Clause Jurisprudence: Has There Been a
Change?, 23 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 143, 144-45 (2003) ("Morrison
brings into question whether environmental regulations that rely on their
aggregated consequences for substantial economic effect will survive the
Supreme Court's new scrutiny of the Commerce Clause, however, following
current federal jurisprudence, it is clear that the Commerce Clause will
continue to provide federal authorities with the power to enact and enforce
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based partly on the Treaty, 36' Necessary and Proper, ' and
Property238 Clauses of the Constitution. 9 Moreover, additional
congressional powers exist upon which the CWARA or similar
legislation could be based.24 °

environmental regulations."). See also Fitzgerald, supra note 14, at 51-68
(contending that the MBR is a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause
power). The uncertainty surrounding the scope of the Commerce Clause with
respect to the CWA suggests that alternative bases of legislative authority
should be used by Congress in enacting CWARA or similar legislation.
236. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Although the Treaty Clause involves the
power of the President to make treaties with the advice and consent of the
Senate, the Necessary and Proper Clause of article 1, section 8 gives Congress
the power to enact federal legislation that is necessary and proper for
effectuating treaties entered into by the United Sates. See, e.g., Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1925). But see Katrina L. Fischer, Harnessingthe
Treaty Power in Support of Environmental Regulation of Activities that Don't
"SubstantiallyAffect Interstate Commerce": Recognizing the Realities of the
New Federalism, 22 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 167, 175 (2004) (suggesting that "an
unbounded treaty power is irreconcilable with the Court's theory of
federalism" and offering a treaty power framework "tailored to accommodate
future application in the environmental realm"); Mark Strasser, Domestic
Relations, Missouri v. Holland, and the New Federalism, 12 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 179, 219 n.268 (2003) (opining that the Supreme Court would not likely
permit Congress to use the treaty power to obviate its federalism decisions);
Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 403, 417 (2003) (noting that the "new federalism decisions also invite
fresh scrutiny of the treaty power by encouraging its creative use to
circumvent federalism restrictions"). Congress may use its other powers, such
as the spending power, to enact legislation that it could not validly enact
pursuant to the Commerce Clause; there is no reason to think that the treaty
power is not among these "other" powers. See Fischer, supra, at 173
("[C]ommentators on the SWANCC decision have suggested that the treaty
power provides a ground independent of the Commerce Clause for upholding
the constitutionality of the CWA's reach to include isolated, intrastate water
bodies."); Swaine, supra, at 403 (noting that "the new federalism doctrines
show a sensitivity toward preserving adequate means to pursue national and
international ends like the treaty power"); infra note 239.
237. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
238. Id. at art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
239. S. 473, § 3(15) ("Protecting the quality of and regulating activities
affecting the waters of the United States is a necessary and proper means of
implementing treaties to which the United States is a party, including treaties
protecting species of fish, birds, and wildlife."); H.R. 962, § 3(15) (same); S.
473, § 3(16) ("Protecting the quality of and regulating activities affecting the
waters of the United States is a necessary and proper means of protecting
Federal land, including hundreds of millions of acres of parkland, refuge land,
and other land under Federal ownership and the wide array of waters [that
land] encompasse[s] ... ."); H.R. 962, § 3(16) (same); S. 473, § 3(17) ("Protecting
the quality of and regulating activities affecting the waters of the United
States is necessary to protect Federal land and waters from discharges of
pollutants and other forms of degradation."); H.R. 962, § 3(17) (same).
240. See, e.g., Eric R. Coulson, Note, Bird Hotels: Are the Resting Spots of
Migratory Birds Entitled to Federal Government Protection Through the
Commerce Clause? Solid Waste of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps
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Congress could also extend CWA jurisdiction to "isolated"
wetlands based on the Spending Clause of Article I, section 8.241 It
has been suggested that Congress could use its spending power to
"extend federal environmental jurisdiction past the limits of the
Commerce Clause if states cooperate" by accepting funds
conditioned upon the states' agreement to protect isolated
wetlands. 2 Indeed, Congress's spending power is not limited by
its enumerated powers and Congress may attach conditions to the
receipt of federal funds in order to advance objectives that it could
not pursue directly.2" Consequently, Lopez and its progeny would
not threaten congressional regulation of intrastate wetlands
exercised pursuant to the Spending Clause.2 " Although Congress's
of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 575, 593 (2002) (noting
that SWANCC noted in its brief to the Supreme Court that "there are ample
constitutional bases in the spending, treaty and property powers for a myriad
of federal statutes protecting waters, wetlands, migratory birds...").
241. Several law review articles have been devoted to the subject of the
spending power as an alternative basis for federal environmental regulations.
See Denis Binder, The Spending Clause as a Positive Source of Environmental
Protection: A Primer, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 147, 148-50 (2001) (suggesting the
Spending Clause as an alternate basis of congressional authority in light of
Lopez and Morrison); Michael J. Gerhardt, FederalEnvironmental Regulation
in a Post-Lopez World: Some Questions andAnswers, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10980,
10988-90 (2000) (noting that congressional regulation of wetlands could be
based upon, inter alia, Congress's spending power); White & Douglas, supra
note 23, at 21 (criticizing the Spending Clause as a basis of authority for
intrastate wetland regulation and suggesting that courts may sustain such
regulation under the Spending Clause if the MBR was held unconstitutional
under the Commerce Clause). Inasmuch as the subject has been previously
addressed, a comprehensive discussion of the spending power as a basis for
federal environmental regulations such as the CWA is beyond the scope of this
Article. See generally Binder, supra, at 159-6 1.
242. Binder, supra note 241, at 153-54, 159-61 (suggesting that the federal
government could condition various grants related to public drinking water
upon enforcement of the CWA or through the use of "wetlands preservation
grants"). See S. 473, § 3(11) ("Millions of people in the United States depend
on wetlands and other waters of the United States to filter water and recharge
surface and subsurface drinking water supplies, protect human health, and
create economic opportunity."). Cf United States v. Dierckman, 201 F.3d 915,
922 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that Congress's Swampbuster program regulating
intrastate wetlands was a valid exercise of its spending power because it is an
indirect regulation not limited by congressional powers enumerated in article
I, section 8); Patrick R. Douglas, Conservation or Coercion:FederalRegulation
of IntrastateWetlands Under the Swampbuster Provisionsof the Food Security
Act, 8 Mo. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV., 59, 59 (2001) (suggesting that Dierckman
"greatly expanded the power of the federal government to regulate wholly
intrastate wetlands").
243. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); Barnes v. Gorman, 536
U.S. 181, 189 (2002) (characterizing Congress's spending power as contractual
in nature, permitting Congress to condition the receipt of federal funds upon
the recipient's agreement to comply with federally imposed conditions).
244. Rebecca E. Zietlow, Federalism's Paradox: The Spending Power and
Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 141, 142-43 (2002)
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spending power is not unlimited, its limits would not bar the
conditioning of funds upon states' acceptance of federal jurisdiction
over intrastate wetlands.14' Nonetheless, Congress would risk
invalidation if it used its spending power to coerce states to enact
legislation protecting isolated wetlands.246
As a result,
constitutional exercise of the spending power would require
Congress to either (1) direct its spending power at nongovernmental persons or entities that receive federal funds (akin
to Swampbuster) or (2) condition the receipt of federal funds by
the states in a non-coercive manner (akin to South Dakota v. Dole).
Of these two alternatives, attaching conditions on federal funding
("The Court's broad reading of the Spending Power creates a paradox:
Congress may use its spending power to accomplish precisely the same goals
the Court found unconstitutionally intrusive on state sovereignty when
attempted through other means."); John C. Eastman, Restoring the "General"
to the General Welfare Clause, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 63, 64 (2001) (noting that "the
Supreme Court has not given any signal to suggest that it would apply its
federalism rulings in the Spending Clause context, and [Dole] strongly
suggests that it would not").
245. Dole set forth several limits upon Congress's spending power. Dole, 483
U.S. at 207-08. First, the spending power must be exercised in pursuit of "the
general welfare." Id. at 207 (noting that when "considering whether a
particular expenditure is intended to serve general public purposes, courts
should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress").
Second, the
spending power must be exercised unambiguously. Id. Third, the conditions
imposed should be related to the particular federal interest or program. Id. at
207-08. Fourth, "other constitutional provisions may provide an independent
bar to the conditional grant of federal funds." Id. at 208. Dole held that
Congress could, pursuant to its spending power, condition the receipt of
federal highway funds upon the states' adoption of a minimum drinking age of
twenty-one. Id. at 209-11. The Dole Court also noted that "in some
circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so
coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion.'" Id. at
211. Dole held, however, that the condition was not coercive where it was
attached to five percent of South Dakota's federal highway funds. Id.
Consequently, Congress could amend the CWA to extend jurisdiction to
intrastate wetlands as long as it followed Dole's roadmap. Moreover, a greater
percentage of funds may come with strings attached because courts rarely find
a congressional spending condition to be coercive. See Zietlow, supra note 244,
at 174 (noting that federal courts have upheld "virtually all conditional federal
spending since the Court's ruling in Dole"); id. at 181 (noting that federal
courts "have shown such resistance to applying the coercion restriction as to
make it a virtually toothless restriction"); Erwin Chemerinsky, Protectingthe
Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 92 (2001) (noting that the Spending
power is "virtually infinite").
246. See Binder, supra note 241, at 153 (noting that "while Congress can
provide grants to states with rationally related conditions attached, it cannot
directly mandate states exercise, in any way, their police powers"). See also
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 926 (1997) (reaffirming that Congress
cannot "compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory
program") (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992));
Binder, supra note 241, at 151-53 (discussing the fine line between conditioned
grants and coercive measures).
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to the states is the more likely method of regulating intrastate
wetlands.2 47 Despite the ostensibly long reach of its spending
power, Congress has not often relied on it - probably because
there was no need to do so until Lopez was decided in 1995.248 In
light of the uncertainty surrounding Congress's ability to use its
commerce power to regulate intrastate wetlands, Congress should
also rely on its spending power in enacting the CWARA or similar
legislation.
Although the subject of much less scholarly attention, the
Taxation Clause of Article I, section 8 could arguably support
federal regulation of intrastate wetlands.149 For example, Congress
could tax developers utilizing NWP's.25 The revenues generated
from such a tax could then be used to fund state grants designed to
protect isolated wetlands or create new wetlands, thereby
requiring developers to bear the economic burden created by the
loss of wetlands under the NWP program. An NWP tax should be
imposed in addition to the ACOE's existing mitigation
requirements. Conjoining mitigation requirements and a NWP
tax would (1) decrease the loss of wetland functions associated
with a mitigation-only approach"' and (2) prevent developers from
shifting the economic burden of their activities to the ACOE (and
hence all federal taxpayers) in the form of monitoring the
mitigation and NWP permit programs.
Regardless of the basis pursuant to which it is enacted,
Congress should enact the CWARA or substantively similar
legislation. Although post-SWANCC case law has softened the
blow by interpreting SWANCC narrowly," SWANCC nonetheless
left unprotected millions of acres of wetlands.'
Furthermore, the
federal regulatory response to SWANCC has further decreased
CWA protections. 4 Consequently, the CWARA is supported by
247. Cf Zietlow, supra note 244, at 174.
248. Cf Binder, supra note 241, at 159; Zietlow, supra note 244, at 148-50;
Boudreaux, supra note 3, at 551.
249. Binder, supra note 241, at 149 n.18 (discussing Congress' use of the
Taxation Clause as a basis of environmental regulations such as the
Superfund).
250. See supra note 19 (discussing NWP's). See also Ostergren, supra note 7,
at 413-14 (same).
251. Cf Press Release, The National Academies, Reforms Needed in
Wetlands Regulatory Program, at
httpJ/www4.nationalacademies.org/
news.nsffisbn0309074320?OpenDocument (June 26, 2000)(questioning the
efficacy of the ACOE's mitigation program).
252. See supra Parts III-IV.
253. Pianin, supra note 194; National Wildlife Federation, Administration
Reverses Course on Clean Water Rules: Put Brakes on Miguided Policy
Proposal, at http://www.nwf.org/enviroaction/index.cfm?issueid=30&articleid=
262&CFID=2063582&CFTOKEN=e64bdbO97ccl9dd9-E0879C82-FE8A-8F457504533E7388824E (Feb. 2004) [hereinafter NWF Press Release].
254. See infra Part VII.
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many states because the legislative gap left by SWANCC shifted
the economic burden of protecting isolated wetlands onto the
states.25 Moreover, congressional clarification of the scope of the
CWA would decrease the volume of CWA jurisdictional litigation
and promote predictability amongst the regulated community.2
SWANCC and its progeny have also prompted a legislative
proposal that would restrict CWA jurisdiction, thereby
"nullify[ing] recent federal court rulings that support an expansive
Representative Richard
view of federal CWA jurisdiction.""7
Baker (R-LA) announced in March of 2004 that he planned to
introduce the Comprehensive Wetlands Conservation and
Management Act ("CWCMA"), which would, inter alia, redefine
"'waters of the United States' as waters 'navigable in fact; adjacent
to such navigable waters; or hydrologically connected to such
navigable waters through a continuous, naturally occurring
2 8
A spokesperson for Representative Baker
surface connection."'
indicated that the CWCMA "is designed to end confusion
As of August 12, 2004, the
stemming from [SWANCC]. "29
CWCMA had not been introduced. Consequently, it is impossible
to examine the bill in any detail. Nonetheless, to the extent that
the CWCMA would essentially adopt the position adopted by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rice and Needham, its passage
should be rejected for the same reasons that a majority of federal
courts have rejected the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of SWANCC.
Indeed, the narrow version of CWA jurisdiction apparently
255. Cf Press Relase, Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, DEQ

Expresses Support for Federal Wetland Protection through the Clean Water
Authority Restoration Act of 2003, at http://www.michigan.gov/deq/0,1607,7135-78077-00.html (Oct. 16, 2003); Wodder, supra note 219 (noting that thirtynine states opposed proposed rule-making that would decrease CWA
jurisdiction); Tiner, Estimated Extent, supra note 210, at 647-48 (noting that
several states have produced estimates of the number of isolated wetlands left

unprotected by SWANCC).
256. Margaret A. Johnston, Note, Environmental Law-Clean Water ActThe Supreme Court Scales Back the Army Corps of Engineers' Jurisdiction
Over "Navigable Waters" Under the Clear Water Act. Solid Waste Agency v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), 24 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 329, 356 (2002).
257. See Press Release, Federal Highway Administration, House Bill Cutting

Clean

Water

Jurisdiction

Would

Nix

Court

Rulings,

at

http://nepa.fhwa.dot.gov/ReNEPA/ReNepa.nsf/0/b2d6a5b4a03e42b885256e520
05996cc?OpenDocument (Mar. 5, 2004).
258. Id. The CWCMA would also (1) require the federal government to
compensate landowners prohibited from developing property containing
wetlands; (2) place the CWA section 404 permit program under the ACOE,
thus eliminating a veto that the EPA currently maintains over ACOE
permitting decisions; and (3) "establish a preference for private-sector

mitigation banks as the primary method of wetlands mitigation." Id.
259. Id. In any event, Congress is not expected to address the controversial

issue in an election year. Id.
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envisioned by the CWCMA would undercut the essential purpose
of the CWA: to prohibit the pollution of America's water resources,
regardless of the manner in which the pollution travels (i.e.,
natural waterways versus manmade connections) or how often
such pollutants travel (i.e., continuous waterways versus
intermittent connections)."
VII.THE REGULATORY RESPONSE TO SWANCC: THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION ABANDONED PLANS FOR REGULATORY
RULE-MAKING THAT WOULD HAVE LIMITED CWA PROTECTIONS

On January 15, 2003, the EPA and the ACOE issued an
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("ANPRM") on the CWA's
regulatory definition of "waters of the United States."26 ' The
ANPRM sought comment on the scope of the CWA after SWANCC
in order to develop regulations clarifying the CWA's regulatory
scope. 262
In aaddition to noting that SWANCC eliminated
jurisdiction over isolated, non-navigable, intrastate waters where
the sole basis of jurisdiction was the presence of migratory birds,
the ANPRM also questioned whether SWANCC further eliminated
"the other factors in the [MBR] or the other rationales" listed in 33
C.F.R. 328.3(a)(3).21
Consequently, the ANPRM sought public
comment on two issues: (1) whether the non-migratory bird factors
(e.g., use by foreign or interstate travelers, the presence of fish or
shellfish that could be sold in interstate commerce) in 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(a)(3)(i)-(iii) remained a valid basis for CWA jurisdiction;
and (2) whether the proposed regulations should define "isolated
waters.""u
As an addendum to the ANPRM, the EPA and the ACOE
issued a joint memorandum providing additional guidance
concerning implementation of the CWA in light of SWANCC
[hereinafter 2003 Joint Memorandum]."
The 2003 Joint
260. Id.
Additionally, the House Water Resources and Environment
Subcommittee conducted a hearing on March 30, 2004 concerning the

"inconsistent determinations by [the ACOE and the EPA] of what is, and is
not, subject to Federal jurisdiction under the [CWA]." U.S. House of
Representatives, The Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment
Hearing On Inconsistent Regulation of Wetlands and Other Waters, at
http://www.house.gov/transportation/water/03-30-04/03-30-4memo.html
(last
visited June 15, 2004). At the time this Article went to press, however, the
subcommittee had not yet taken action.
261. See ANPRM, 68 Fed. Reg. at 1991. See also Kunz, supra note 5, at 491
(discussing the ANPRM).

262. ANPRM, 68 Fed. Reg. at 1991-93.
263. ANPRM, 68 Fed. Reg. at 1993; Ostergren, supra note 7, at 399-400
(noting that the ANPRM disavowed all jurisdiction under the MBR and
questioned the continued vitality of § 328.3(a)(3)).

264. ANPRM, 68 Fed. Reg. at 1994.
265. ANPRM, 68 Fed. Reg. at 1995; supra note 193 (discussing the 2003
Joint Memorandum).
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Memorandum
provided
"clarifying
guidance"
concerning
SWANCC, thus superseding the 2001 Joint Memorandum issued
by the Clinton Administration." The 2003 Joint Memorandum
construed SWANCC narrowly, noting that it eliminated "CWA
jurisdiction over isolated waters that are intrastate and nonnavigable, where the sole basis for asserting CWA jurisdiction is
the actual or potential use of the waters as habitat for migratory
birds.... 267
The 2003 Joint Memorandum also questioned
whether SWANCC effectively eliminated non-bird factors listed in
the MBR, such as use of the waters as a habitat for endangered68
species or to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.2
Accordingly, it noted that neither the ACOE nor the EPA would
"assert CWA jurisdiction over isolated waters that are both
intrastate and non-navigable, where the sole basis available for
asserting CWA jurisdiction rests on any of the factors listed in the
[MBRI .69 Additionally, ACOE and EPA field staff were directed
to "seek formal project-specific HQ approval prior to asserting
jurisdiction over 270
waters based on other factors listed in 33 CFR
328.3(a)(3)(i)-(iii).
On December 16, 2003, the ACOE and the EPA "announced
that they would not issue a new rule [clarifying CWA] jurisdiction
over isolated wetlands."2 7' The decision to abandon the proposed
rule-making was likely a result of the 133,000 (mostly negative)
comments received by the ACOE in response to the ANPRM.272

266. ANPRM, 68 Fed. Reg. at 1995.
267. Id. at 1996.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1997-1998. See also Elizabeth Shogren, EPA to Review Clean
Water Act's Scope, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, at A12, available at 2003 WL
2377326 (noting that CWA advocates feared that field staff would "choose not
to require a permit for a body of water, rather than go to the trouble of
appealing to Washington for a decision").
271. See Press Release, Environmental Protection Agency, EPA and Army
Corps Issue Wetlands Decision, at http:/yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/
blab9f485b098972852562e7004dc686/540f28acf38d7f9b85256dfe00714ab0?Op
enDocument (Dec. 16, 2003) [hereinafter Joint Press Release]; BNA, 72
U.S.L.W. at 2361-62; Pianin, supra note 194 (noting that President Bush made
the decision to abandon "plans for regulatory changes that would have sharply
reduced the number of federally protected streams and wetlands"); NWF Press
Release, supra note 253.
272. BNA, 72 U.S.L.W. at 2361; GAO Report, supra note 19, at 14 (noting
that ninety-nine percent of the 133,000 comments received were opposed to
new rulemaking). Those opposed to the proposed rule-making included 218
members of Congress, state regulators, environmentalists, and sportsmen. Id.
See also BNA, 72 U.S.L.W. at 2361 ("[Mlany of the comments came from state
regulators concerned that a federal rulemaking could narrow the scope of
federal jurisdiction, putting too many wetlands at risk. Several states
commented that they did not have authority or financial resources to protect
their wetlands that suddenly did not enjoy protection under Section 404 of the
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Indeed, opponents of the proposed rulemaking contended that it
would have jeopardized up to 20 million acres of wetlands. 73
Nonetheless, the EPA and the ACOE will continue to rely on the
2003 Joint Memorandum, which itself jeopardizes millions of acres
of wetlands by imposing a procedural hurdle that will deter ACOE
district staff from exercising jurisdiction in close cases. 74 Although
encouraged by the Bush Administration's decision to abandon its
proposed rulemaking, CWA advocates continue to press for the
rescission of the policy guidance issued on January 15, 2003. 5 In
any event, in October of 2003 the ACOE "agreed to an EPA
request to collect data measuring the extent to which [SWANCC
has] prompted [ACOE] district offices to avoid the regulation of

federal Clean Water Act.") ; Pianin, supra note 194; Elizabeth Shogren, Rule
Drafted that Would Dilute the Clean Water Act, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2003, at
A12, available at 2003 WL 2446562 ("In comments on the [proposed
rulemaking], states almost unanimOusly urged the federal government to
retain a broad definition of waters of the United States.").
273. Id.; Pianin, supra note 194. The Bush Administration's decision to
refrain from rulemaking may also have been prompted by the reaction to the
draft rule, which was leaked in November of 2003 to the Los Angeles Times.
See National Wildlife Federation, Congress Rejects Bush Administration's
Efforts to Remove Federal Protectionsfrom Nation's Wetlands and Streams, at
http://www.nwf.org/news/story.cfm?pageId=13C93164-65BF-117358078EE61E01C3B2 (Nov. 25, 2003) (noting that 218 members of Congress
signed a letter opposing a draft rule by the Bush Administration that would
have scaled back the CWA); National Wildlife Federation, Draft Rule
Threatens to Strip Clean Water Act Protections From Nation's Water
Resources, available at http://www.nwf.orgnwfwebadmin/binaryVault/
CWARulemaking-fact-sheet.pdf (last visited July 19, 2004)(outlining the
changes that the draft rule would have effected, including the removal of CWA
protection for (1) ephemeral and intermittent streams, (2) some wetlands
adjacent to tributaries, and (3) manmade connections such as ditches and
drainage pipes); Robert R.M. Verchick, Toward Normative Rules for Agency
Interpretation:Defining Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L.
REV. 845, 869-71, 871 n. 158 (setting forth the draft rule) (2004). See also
Shogren, supra note 272 (discussing a leaked copy of the Bush
Administration's draft rule that would have, inter alia, removed protection for
waters that lacked groundwater as a source and waters that flowed less than
six months out of the year).
274. See id.; GAO Report, supra note 19, at 14 n.14 (noting that of the seven
cases for which ACOE districts have sought headquarters' approval, six were
found to be jurisdictional and one was found not jurisdictional); Mank, supra
note 11, at 882 (noting that unidentified EPA officials "acknowledged off the
record that requiring approval for field staff decisions will likely curtail the
agencies' jurisdiction.. ."); Verchick, supra note 273, at 846-47, 870
(explaining that the guidance remains in effect, but will be reviewed); Pianin,
supra note 194; Press Release, Sierra Club, Broad Backlash Prompts Bush
Reversal on Misquided Water Rule: Administration Fails to Rescind Guidance
Discouraging Enforcement of Clean Water Protections: Statement of Carl
Pope, Executive Director, at http'//www.sierraclub.orgpressroom/releases/
pr2003-12-16.asp (Dec. 16, 2003); NWF Press Release, supra note 252.
275. NWF Press Release, supra note 253; Pianin, supra note 194, at A20.
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wetlands and other waters."27
Enactment of the CWARA,
however, would obviate the problems associated with the 2003
Joint Memorandum - until the Commerce Clause showdown at the
Supreme Court.277
VIII.CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in SWANCC has been the
source of much litigation and scholarly attention. Most of the
attention has focused on the extent of SWANCC's impact on CWA
jurisdiction. The majority of courts addressing the issue, including
the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals
have construed SWANCC narrowly, holding that CWA jurisdiction
extends over all waters hydrologically connected to navigable
waters and that SWANCC's sole casualty was the part of the MBR
related to migratory birds - and perhaps jurisdiction based upon
effects on interstate commerce that are unrelated to navigation.278
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, on the other hand, construed
SWANCC broadly in Rice and Needham, holding that federal
regulatory jurisdiction under the OPA (and hence the CWA) only
extends to waters that are either actually navigable or adjacent to
a navigable body of water. 79
Although commentators decried SWANCC as "the most
devastating judicial opinion affecting the environment ever,"2 80 the
narrow construction of SWANCC adopted by a majority of federal
courts addressing the issue indicates that SWANCC was not as
damaging to the federal government's ability to regulate wetlands
as was initially thought. Indeed, SWANCC did not alter federal
regulatory jurisdiction over waters as channels of interstate
commerce as opposed to waters that may affect interstate
commerce. 28 1
Nonetheless, SWANCC did eliminate CWA
276. GAO Report, supra note 19, at 15.
EPA oversight of ACOE
jurisdictional determinations may help ensure that ACOE districts do not
apply SWANCC too broadly.
277. To the extent, however, that the CWARA is not based on Congress's
power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, then
the Supreme Court may not have to address the question left unanswered in

SWANCC.
278. Cf supra note 6 (noting that the Supreme Court denied petitions for
certiorari that challenged decisions by the Fourth and Sixth Circuit Courts of
Appeal).
279. Although Rice and Needham shed some light on how the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals will construe SWANCC with respect to the scope of the CWA,
these decisions are nonetheless dicta because they addressed the OPA. See
Wood, supra note 15, at 10188.
280. See Funk, supra note 5, at 10741
281. See, e.g., Lamplight, 2002 WL 360652 at *6 (noting that, where bodies
of water are being regulated as channels of interstate commerce, as opposed to
waters that may affect interstate commerce, SWANCC is irrelevant because it
"involved isolated waters lacking a physical/hydrological connection to other
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jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate, non-navigable waters where
the sole basis was the presence of migratory birds. This reduction
of federal regulatory jurisdiction has adversely impacted wetlands
preservation, especially in arid areas of the country such as
California and the southwest, areas where isolated wetlands
comprise a significant percentage of existing wetlands. Any
additional loss of wetlands beyond the estimated annual loss of up
to 300,000 acres further threatens a resource that helps maintain
the integrity of America's water resources and provides functions
such as biodiversity, flood control, as well as seafood and
migratory waterfowl production. Consequently, Congress should
enact the CWARA or substantively similar legislation restoring
the CWA to its pre-SWANCC status by removing the term
"navigable" from the CWA.
Furthermore, Congress should
consider basing the CWARA or similar legislation on, inter alia,
Congress's spending power, which is not limited by the Supreme
Court's recent federalist jurisprudence reigning in the Commerce
Clause.

navigable waters").

